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ABSTRACT 
 
Non-traditional family arrangements are currently denied legal and social 
recognition as families. This lack of recognition comes from their failure 
to meet the standard of the prevailing matrimonial-family model. As a 
result, these families face a very inequitable society that discriminates 
toward them in every turn. Furthermore, the legal fixation to promote a 
specific model of the family has produced a very incoherent legal scheme. 
This article explores whether a more egalitarian society and a more sound 
legal system may be achieved by extending the protections and benefits of 
marriage to more groups or, alternatively, whether it would be better to 
abolish civil marriage in order to achieve such a goal. Instead of 
following a liberal framework, the article examines the problem from a 
Neo-Marxist perspective; specifically, Gramsci’s ideas of hegemony and 
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hegemonic contestation, and Luckas’ idea of reification. By doing so, the 
article unveils two principles that explain why the conception of the family 
has remained unaltered and non-traditional family arrangements are still 
not recognized as families. These two concepts are: (1) the hegemonic 
discourse of family-normativity and (2) the reified idea that family 
arrangements must be legally regulated. The article argues that if we truly 
seek that the state recognizes the existence of diverse family arrangements 
and does not favor one of those arrangements over the others, the most 
viable way to do so is by unmasking the reified legal regulation of the 
family as the social construct that it is. The only way to do so is by 
abolishing civil marriage and eradicating all the marriage proxies that 
exist in the law. As soon as the state disengages from the practice of 
defining the family and redirects its regulatory efforts to identify proxies 
that are truly related to the social goods it intends to promote, we would 
be on the path of recognizing and granting rights to the multiplicity of 
family arrangements that exist and the members thereof. 
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I. NOT FOR BETTER, BUT FOR WORSE 
All happy families are alike; each unhappy family is unhappy in its 
own way.
1
 
I explore in this article whether a more egalitarian society may be achieved 
by extending the protections and benefits of marriage to more groups or, 
alternatively, whether it would be better to abolish civil marriage in order 
to achieve such a goal. Currently, non-standard family arrangements are 
denied legal protections and benefits as well as social recognition because 
their failure to meet the paradigms of the matrimonial-family model. 
Furthermore, in our fixation with promoting a specific model of the family 
we have produced a very incoherent legal scheme. Consequently, 
answering this inquiry requires examining why we still adhere to an 
unequivocal definition of the family
2
 as a bureaucratized,
3
 monogamous, 
sexuated,
4
 married couple with children. It also requires examining how as 
society we could achieve what Professors Alice Ristroph and Melissa 
Murray have denominated as familial disestablishment: requiring the state 
to recognize the existence of diverse family arrangements and prohibiting 
the state from favoring one of those arrangements over the others.
5
 
Attaining familial disestablishment is vital for addressing the three main 
 
 
 1. LEO TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA 1 (Richard Pevear & Larissa Volokhonsky trans., Viking, 
1st American ed. 2001) (1873–1877). 
 2. Although the best term to refer to all familial arrangements should be families, due to 
considerations of custom and usage I will employ the family as the term for doing so.  
 3. As it will be explained in infra Part V.B, the term bureaucratized in this paper is used to 
denote the creation of function-specific roles within a pre-determined hierarchy in the family. 
 4. This term encapsulates the general understanding that adults in a family arrangement are 
united in such an arrangement because of a sexual relationship. If they are not engaging or are not 
capable of engaging in a sexual relationship, then they have not come together in a family 
arrangement. In other words, the adults in a family arrangement are thought through the lens of 
sexuality and their bodies are nothing less but sexual bodies. See infra Part V.B. See DRUCILLA 
CORNELL, AT THE HEART OF FREEDOM 7 (1998). 
 5. Alice Ristroph & Melissa Murray, Disestablishing the Family, 119 YALE L.J. 1236, 1251 
(2010). 
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problems we presently experience with our current legal regulation of the 
family.  
First, our legal system prevents a large group of people from exploring 
alternative ways to arrange intimate relationships by signaling and 
channeling people into a particular arrangement. Second, an inconsistent 
body of law that does not protect the real interests it claims to promote 
because it is premised on the marriage proxy, or simply put, on using the 
institution of marriage as a synonym for family when granting legal rights 
and benefits Finally, this inconsistent body of regulation has generated 
profound legal and social inequalities that oppose the basic tenants of our 
society. 
I survey the answers given thus far to these problems by contemporary 
liberal scholars—such as Martha Nussbaum, Tamara Metz and Jessica 
Knouse—using the discourse of rights, and conclude that such a 
theoretical framework is insufficient to encompass the multiple 
dimensions of familial establishment. These responses that are based on 
the discourse of rights ignore the use of the marriage proxy, its pernicious 
effects, and intend only to broaden who is covered under the current 
established definition of the family. Consequently, they ultimately bring us 
back to familial establishment and reinstate the same inequality problems 
we face today.  
Thus, I propose moving away from the narrative of rights to the 
narrative of power; instead, I will take a Neo-Marxist approach, which is 
the best theoretical framework to understand the nature of the pheonema 
that gave rise to familial establishment and its detrimental effects. 
Specifically, I employ Gramsci’s ideas of hegemony and hegemonic 
contestation,
6
 and Luckas’ idea of reification.7 This framework will help 
us understand how Family Law and various discourses related to the 
family have changed while the conception of the family has remained 
unaltered. It will also help us in comprehending why religious 
disestablishment has been possible in the United States while family 
disestablishment has not.  
By analyzing the established definition of the family from this 
perspective, this article draws three conclusions. First, I conclude that our 
 
 
 6. An abridged description of hegemony is the institutionalization of hidden practices of 
domination through the establishment of a worldview by the ruling class. The hegemonic contestation 
is the process whereby that worldview is brought to the political arena to be challenged and 
transformed. See infra Part V.A. 
 7. Reification refers to when a social construct is treated as something fixed and unchangeable. 
See infra Part V.D.1.  
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subject of study should be the family-marriage dyad—a social and legal 
conflation of marriage and family as one unequivocal institution. We 
should not be talking about marriage and family separately, since our 
current legal process of granting rights to family arrangements is premised 
on using marriage as a proxy.  
Second, in order to really understand the legal and social ramifications 
of that dyad, we must acknowledge that there is a hegemonic discourse to 
which courts, scholars and people in general have been making reference 
without really naming it or establishing its contours. That hegemonic 
discourse is family-normativity. Family-normativity attempts to dictate 
how family relationships should be lived and arranged as well as to signal 
which affectionate relations are of social importance and which are not. It 
encompasses the bureaucratization of family relations, the promotion of 
two-person sexuated relationships, a monogamous ethic, and the 
establishment of child rearing as essential to the human families.  
Finally, the reason why we are not able to move from an unequivocal 
definition of the family and to familial disestablishment is because the 
hegemonic discourse of family-normativity has not been contested yet. 
The reified idea that family arrangements must be legally regulated and 
the removal of the family from the political realm have precluded that 
contestation from ensuing. 
If we truly seek familial disestablishment, the most viable way to 
achieve it is by unmasking the reified legal regulation of the family as the 
social construct that it is, so that family-normativity could be actually 
contested. In order to do so, it is essential to engage in dialectical thinking. 
The only way to do so is by abolishing civil marriage and eradicating all 
the marriage proxies that exist in the law. This would bring the family 
back to the public domain and permit individuals to defy family-
normativity. As soon as the state disengages from the practice of defining 
the family and directs its regulatory efforts to identify proxies that are 
truly related to the social goods it intends to promote, we would be on the 
path of recognizing and granting rights to the multiplicity of family 
arrangements that exist and the members thereof. This would eradicate 
social inequalities and create a more coherent body of law that truly 
protects the interests it contends to protect.  
II. WHEN THE COURTSHIP ENDS . . . 
SOPHIA: Kristen, you are just upset. We all are. But you have to 
know: These two women love her like a sister. And I love your 
mother as she was my own.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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KRISTEN: But you are forgetting one thing though. I’m her 
daughter. You are not her family. 
DOROTHY: Why does everybody keep saying that? We share our 
lives together. 
KRISTEN: You share a house together.
8
 
To illustrate better my argument, I would like to share the genesis of this 
project. In 2006, I was teaching a seminar on current issues in Family 
Law. To start the conversation with my students, I screened an Italian film 
which raises the issue of what constitutes a family. The film entitled Le 
Fate Ignoranti portrays a very unconventional family.
9
 The family was 
composed of a widow, the gay lover of her husband, an ex-prostitute, an 
immigrant, a transsexual, and an HIV patient. These characters shared 
occasionally or on a permanent basis a common living space, helped and 
took care of each other, and shared religiously the dinner table every 
Sunday. The United States cover for the DVD and the poster for the film 
included, as part of their promotion, the slogan: “Some of the best families 
are made of friends.” After the screening, I asked my students whether the 
people in the film were a family and were entitled to any rights. Their 
answer was striking. My students all agreed that those characters look 
more like a family than theirs do, but they were not a family and therefore 
should not have any protections.  
Their responses highlight poignantly the legal and social conflicts 
addressed in this paper: we are able to acknowledge the existence of 
unconventional family arrangements and recognize them as a family unit, 
but we are not willing to give them the title of a family and the social and 
legal recognition that such title entails. We are not even willing to engage 
in a debate over the legality of such a possibility, and the reason for such 
reluctance—even after years of Family law reform—strives in the 
hegemonic discourse of family-normativity and our obsession with the 
narrative of rights. 
III. A VOW TO INEQUALITY: FAMILIAL ESTABLISHMENT 
MRS. MADRIGAL: He’s a sweet boy, Mona. I approve of him 
wholeheartedly. 
 
 
 8. The Golden Girls: Home Again, Rose: Part 2 (NBC television broadcast May 2, 1992). 
 9. LE FATE IGNORANTI [THE IGNORANT FARIES], distributed in the United States as HIS SECRET 
LIFE (R&C Produzioni 2001).  
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MONA RAMSAY: You make it sound like we’re married or 
something. 
MRS. MADRIGAL: There are all kinds of marriages, dear. 
MONA RAMSAY: I don’t think you understand the trip with me and 
Michael. 
MRS. MADRIGAL: Mona, lots of things are more binding than sex. 
They last longer too.
10
 
Family Law seems to have undergone a dramatic transformation in the 
past half-century. Rules promoting the subordination of women have 
largely been abolished,
11
 domestic violence has been adopted as a valid 
state concern,
12
 and the recognition of non-heterosexual couples is now a 
trend.
13
 In addition, the growing use of new reproductive practices has 
triggered legal reforms to the extent that some jurists believe that the 
United States is currently struggling with the scope and the meaning of the 
family.
14
 Some scholars have gone so far as to argue that “[r]edefining the 
family has become all the rage in the legal academy.”15  
However, if we were to take a closer look into the legal reforms and 
scholarly work devoted to the family, we would observe that such a 
redefinition of the family has not really taken place. In fact, it has not even 
started. In spite of a century of continuous legal reforms, the pivotal 
institution in Family Law—the family itself—has remained intact.16 The 
 
 
 10. Tales of the City (Channel 4 television broadcast 1993).  
 11. See Fran Olsen, The Politics of Family Law, 2 LAW & INEQ. 1, 4 (1984); Simeone v. 
Simeone, 581 A.2d 162 (Pa. 1990); Edwardson v. Edwardson, 798 S.W.2d 941 (Ky. 1990). 
 12. See Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1373 (2000); JEFFREY FAGAN, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: PROMISES AND LIMITS (1995). 
 13. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 
N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006); Martinez v. Cnty. of Monroe, 
850 N.Y.S.2d 740 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Public Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 
2008); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Ia. 2009); 
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Gill v. Office of Pers.l Mgmt., 699 F. 
Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010); Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 
2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010). 
 14. See JANET DOLGIN, DEFINING THE FAMILY: LAW, TECHNOLOGY, AND REPRODUCTION IN AN 
UNEASY AGE 15–17 (1997). 
 15. John DeWitt Gregory, Redefining the Family: Undermining the Family, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 381, 381 (2004). 
 16. See generally Ariela R. Dubler, In the Shadow of Marriage: Single Women and the Legal 
Construction of the Family and the State, 112 YALE L.J. 1641 (2003); Robert C. Post & Reva B. 
Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family 
and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943 (2003); Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 
MICH. L. REV. 189 (2007); Ristroph & Murray, supra note 5. 
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idea of the family has remained, over the past millennia, one of a 
bureaucratized, monogamous, sexuated, married couple with children.
17
 
A. Familial Establishment: A Historical Account 
A diachronic inquiry about how the family has been defined reveals 
that the current social construct of the family is a product of the 
theological work of the Catholic Church. Tracking out legal and 
philosophical history, the family evolved from the proprietary idea of the 
pater familias to a concept intrinsically linked to the institution of 
marriage; from the subordinated relationships of master-slave to the idea 
of conjugal, legal or blood kinship; from people living under one roof to 
the bureaucratized, monogamous, sexuated couple with children.
18
 
Since its inception into our culture, the term family has been tied to a 
hierarchical system created to ensure subordination. The voice family 
comes from the Latin voice famula, which is a derivative of famulus. The 
meaning of the latter is servant, a concept imbedded with the ideas of 
inequality and property.
19
 In addition, linguistic studies contend that the 
word family has a remote connection with the word vama from Sanskrit, in 
which it signified a home or dwelling place.
20
 This philological history 
tends to indicate that in its original conception the family was not 
associated as it is today with notions of kinship—legal or blood—but that 
it included as well persons not related by those bonds who lived together 
under the same roof in bureaucratized arrangements. Under that original 
understanding of the family it was possible to constitute families not based 
on sexuated relationships or in blood kinship—an understanding non-
existent for most parts of Western society today. For instance, the Romans 
defined the family as the social organism whose master (the man) had 
under his power (under the patria potestas) his wife, his sons and 
daughters, and a certain number of slaves, and over all of whom he had the 
right of life.
21
 
 
 
 17. This unequivocal definition of the family is the embodiment of the hegemonic discourse of 
family-normativity. For a full discussion on family-normativity, please refer to infra Part V.B. The 
concept is introduced here to facilitate the discussion of familial establishment and hegemonic 
discourses, and as a way to refer to the current established definition of the family throughout the 
footnotes. 
 18. The profound divergences between these two conceptions illustrate how the concept of the 
family is nothing less than a construct that responds to the societal forces that surround it. See Jill 
Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 829 (2004). 
 19. EMILIO MENÉNDEZ, LECCIONES DE DERECHO DE FAMILIA 121 (1981). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id at 124. 
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However, with the fall of the Empire into Christian hands, that 
conception started to shift to an idea more similar to our current one. Once 
Christian ideas percolated the Roman Empire, the family then came to be 
associated with conjugal unions.
22
 The Church and its thinkers promoted 
the idea that the marital family was the only arrangement deserving of the 
title of the family. With that association, the other elements of our current 
conception of the family entered the scene. The addition of marriage to the 
concept of the family meant the addition as well of monogamous sexuated 
couples with children as essential to the idea of the family. Catholic 
theologians conceptualize marriage as the exclusive social union of two 
beings with the sole purpose of reproduction.
23
 The rhetoric surrounding 
the idea of the conjugal family in which marriage is seen as a way to get 
closer to God and to contribute to the well-being of the spouses was just 
created to promote the activity of reproduction and assured child-rearing 
would remain exclusively in the hands of the spouses. One of the first 
people who argued for the hierarchical, child rearing, monogamous 
conjugal family was Saint Augustine of Hippo, whose vision was later 
reiterated by Saint Thomas Aquinas and enacted into Canon Law.
24
 That 
vision was later reproduced into the laws of the new Nation-States that 
took the regulation of the family from the Canon Law and poured it into 
 
 
 22. See John Witte, Jr., Retrieving and Reconstructing Law, Religion and Marriage in the 
Western Tradition, in THE FAMILY TRANSFORMED: RELIGION, VALUES AND THE FAMILY IN MODERN 
AMERICA 244–68 (Steven M. Tipton & John Witte, Jr. eds., 2006); Lyla H. O’Driscoll, Toward a New 
Theory of the Family, in THE AMERICAN FAMILY AND THE STATE 81–101 (Joseph R. Peden & Fred R. 
Glahe eds., 1986).  
 23. See Witte, supra note 22. We can see how this idea is embodied in Canon Law. For instance, 
Canon 1055.1 states that: 
The matrimonial covenant, by which a man and a woman establish between themselves a 
partnership of the whole of life and which is ordered by its nature to the good of the spouses 
and the procreation and education of offspring, has been raised by Christ the Lord to the 
dignity of a sacrament between the baptized. 
1983 Code c. 1055, § 1 (1983). See also John Bingham, Government’s Marriage Document Makes No 
Reference to Children, Husbands Or Wives, THE TELEGRAPH (June 13, 2012), http://www.telegraph.co 
.uk/news/religion/9327724/Governments-marriage-document-makes-no-reference-to-children-husbands-
or-wives.html (discussing how under the teachings of the Catholic Church “marriage joins husband and 
wife in a life-long bond that is ordered essentially, if not in every instance, to their roles as father and 
mother and recognises their responsibilities related to procreation and generational care-giving.”). 
 24. See Witte, supra note 22. This formulation of the family was originally restricted to 
heterosexuality, and continues to be associated under Catholicism and other Christian religions with 
heteronormativity. However, as we will show in infra Part V.B, family-normativity and 
heteronormativity are two separated hegemonic discourses that—albeit having been historically 
conflated in the regulation of the family—are not necessarily kept together in the regulation of the 
family. That is the reason why our system has been able to recognize gay marriage and not siblings, 
elderly people living together, or polygamous and polyamorous groups as families. 
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their civil codes and common law.
25
 The same succession of events 
happened in the Protestant Nation-States. Even through the schism with 
the Catholic Church, this formulation of the family was preserved by the 
Protestants and passed along to their corresponding legal traditions.
26
  
This conception of the bureaucratized, monogamous, sexuated married 
couple with children has remained in place up to this date as the 
unequivocal definition of the family. This idea is so settled into our legal 
conscience that it was even elevated to a fundamental right status. Article 
16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Declaration) states that: 
(1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, 
nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a 
family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during 
marriage and at its dissolution. 
(2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent 
of the intending spouses. 
(3) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society 
and is entitled to protection by society and the State.
27
 
The Declaration links the beginning of the family with the celebration of a 
marriage, as if marriage was a sine qua non requisite for the establishment 
of a family. That link also connects the family with the idea of a 
monogamous, sexuated couple with children. However, by asserting that 
the family (in this case the marital one) deserves the protection of the state, 
the Declaration legally ostracizes other family arrangements by not 
affording them any protection. Notwithstanding this contradiction, this 
definition of the family has not only been incorporated into International 
Law, but has evolved to the point of becoming a fundamental tenant of the 
United States legal system.  
The bureaucratized, monogamous, sexuated, married couple with 
children has been incorporated into our system of law as the sole 
definition of the family to be followed and promoted. That type of state 
endorsement to a specific conception of the family has been denominated 
as familial establishment, as there is a de facto official conception of the 
 
 
 25. See id. 
 26. See id. See also Jane C. Murphy, Rules, Responsibility and Commitment to Children: The 
New Language of Morality in Family Law, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 1111, 1136, 1162 (1999); Jessica 
Knouse, Civil Marriage: Threat to Democracy, 18 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 361, 409 (2012). 
 27. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, Art. 16 
(1948) (emphasis added). 
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family being imposed by the state to the detriment of all the other family 
arrangements.
28
 Surprisingly, the United Sates has embraced familial 
establishment without much opposition. However, we should question 
whether there should be a single definition of the family when there are 
numerous types of familial arrangements that deserve political recognition 
and protection, and whose members are citizens just like those individuals 
who have decided to arrange their families following the established 
definition.  
B. Familial Establishment and the Marriage Proxy 
As Professors Ristroph and Murray note, it is puzzling how “the liberal 
commitment to religious disestablishment [in the United States] has never 
led to any similar call for familial disestablishment.”29 Even though the 
United States has shown an amazing capacity to accommodate religious 
plurality and other forms of societal diversity, it keeps denying family 
plurality. The United States also recognizes and promotes an unequivocal 
version of the family, although such conception has not been the only one 
in the history of humankind and is not followed by a large group of people 
today in this country. Familial disestablishment—understood as the 
recognition of the existence of diverse family arrangements and the State’s 
preclusion from favoring one of them—has not been part of any 
significant political discussion or legal reform in the United States. The 
main reason for this lack of commitment to transform the socio-legal 
understanding of the family is that it has not yet been acknowledged that 
the United States is, in fact, a state with an established definition of the 
family.  
The lack of recognition of this fact comes from the subtle way in which 
familial establishment has been imposed. Familial establishment has been 
crafted by making use of the marriage proxy, and not by directly enacting 
the established definition into law. We can see how the marriage proxy 
works by looking again at Article 16 of the Declaration of Human Rights. 
Marriage embodies the established definition of the family; and the state, 
instead of legally defining the family, uses marriage as a way to determine 
what arrangement constitutes a family. Courts have been explicit as to how 
the marriage proxy works. For instance, the California Supreme Court has 
recognized that “[t]he right to marry represents the right of an individual to 
 
 
 28. See Ristroph & Murray, supra note 5. 
 29. Id. at 1251. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
200 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 5:189 
 
 
 
 
establish a legally recognized family. . . .”30 Jurisprudence is not the only 
area that reflects the understanding that family and marriage are deeply 
intertwined; scholars currently writing in topics related to the family are 
also often blinded by the marriage proxy. For instance, Edward A. 
Zelinsky argues that “marriage itself conveys a message, a message of 
commitment, a message of family.”31  
Ristroph and Murray are among the scholars who have begun to point 
out how the family is regulated using marriage as a proxy in the United 
States.
32
 They support their position by reviewing the jurisprudence 
concerned with unmarried fathers. The professors contrast how the United 
States Supreme Court treats unmarried fathers differently in function of 
how much their presence in the lives of their children resembles that of 
married fathers.  
For instance, in situations in which the unmarried fathers have 
cohabited with the children and provided them with the emotional support 
a married father would, as in Stanley v. Illinois,
33
 the Supreme Court has 
permitted unmarried fathers to exercise wed fathers’ prerogatives, such as 
not declaring automatically the children wards of the state upon the death 
of their mother.
34
 However, in instances in which the Supreme Court has 
found that there is a marital relationship to protect over the biological one 
or the unwed father has not behaved in a manner similar to a married one, 
such as in Quillon v. Walcott
35
 and Lehr v. Robertson
36
 respectively, the 
Supreme Court has refused even to recognize biological parents’ 
prerogatives like the right to challenge a petition for adoption.
37
 The 
 
 
 30. In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th 757, 814–15 (2008). 
 31. Edward A. Zelinsky, Deregulating Marriage: The Pro-Marriage Case for Abolishing Civil 
Marriage, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1161, 1209 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 32. Ristroph & Murray, supra note 5, at 1252. 
 33. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
 34. Following the same rationale, other courts have permitted unwed fathers to exercise married 
fathers’ rights. For instance, in Lewis v Roberts, 495 N.E.2d 810 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986), the court 
decided that an imprisoned unmarried father retained parental rights to his daughter since he wrote to 
her frequently and made continuing efforts to obtain visits with her thereby precluding her adoption by 
her new stepfather. Likewise in Estate of Scheller v. Pessetto, 783 P.2d 70 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), the 
court opined that in order for an a biological father to inherit from his illegitimate child, it must be 
shown that the father has openly treated the child as his own and has not refused to support the child 
before; since it promotes the legitimate state interest of providing efficient estate administration and 
promoting development of meaningful relationships between illegitimate children and their fathers.  
 35. 434 U.S. 246 (1978). 
 36. 463 U.S. 248 (1983). 
 37. Other courts, for instance, have denied visitation rights to biological fathers following the 
same rationale that there is a marital relationship to protect over the biological one. See Ruggles v. 
Riggs, 477 A.2d 697 (Del. 1984); Steglich v. Guerrero, 437 So. 2d 209 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 
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climax in this line of cases is, for Ristroph and Murray, Michael H. v. 
Gerald D.
38
 In that case the Supreme Court did not recognize the parental 
rights of a biological father who was the lover of the mother but who was 
not the legal father of the child, even though the child regarded both the 
biological father and her legal father (her mother’s husband) equally as 
father figures.
39
 The Supreme Court refused to recognize this 
unconventional two-fathers-one-mother arrangement as a family, and went 
even further to assert that that the family unit to which our society 
traditionally has accorded respect is the unit “typified, of course, by the 
marital family.”40  
These expressions evidence how the family is legally defined through 
marriage. They also illustrate how powerful the proxy of marriage is in 
promoting the unequivocal definition of the family as a bureaucratized, 
monogamous, sexuated couple with children. Moreover, it exposes how 
the marriage proxy is used to deny rights to a large sector of society whose 
familial arrangements are not the conventional one. In this way, family 
plurality’s visibility is diminished, and the exclusion of non-conventional 
arrangements is secured. In addition, the deep contradictions of (a) failing 
to grant biological parents their biological rights because they are not 
married and (b) including a definition that denies rights to individuals in a 
declaration of rights show how the negative effects of familial 
establishment pass for the most part—as the established definition itself—
unnoticed. 
C. The Effects of Familial Establishment 
Though unnoticed, the negative effects of familial establishment are 
far-reaching. The marriage proxy does not only manifest itself in matters 
closely related to the traditional family structure like paternal relations and 
paternal rights, but extends to other corners of familial and political life. A 
line of cases relating to the right of privacy reveals how pervasive the use 
of the proxy of marriage is in regulating familial arrangements and 
excluding people from accessing certain rights. In this group of cases, we 
can see how the Supreme Court promotes the idea of the marital couple as 
the natural familial arrangement superior to any other.  
 
 
1983); LeHew v. Mellyn, 475 N.E.2d 913 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st 1985); In re Connolly, 332 N.E.2d 376 
(Ohio Ct. App. 10th 1974). 
 38. 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
 39. See Ristroph & Murray, supra note 5, at 1254. 
 40. Gerald D., 491 U.S. at 123 (emphasis added). 
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In Griswold v. Connecticut,
41
 the Supreme Court found 
unconstitutional a statute that criminalized providing or using any 
contraceptive methods or services since such intrusion “is repulsive to the 
notions surrounding the marriage relationship,”42 which is a “sacred” 
institution that holds “a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights.”43 
The language of the Court suggests that marriage is a natural institution 
that precedes even the state, and it should be promoted by privileging it 
over other family arrangements through curtailing state intervention into 
the institution. Indeed, the case was decided in such a way precisely 
because it involved a married couple; otherwise the intrusion would have 
been permitted. It took almost a decade for that right to be extended to 
individuals in Eisenstadt v. Baird.
44
 However, even in Eisenstadt the Court 
was promoting marriage and family privacy.
45
 The Supreme Court 
sustained the decision on the basis that the right of the married couple 
would mean nothing if the individuals who conform the married couple do 
not hold that right.
46
 
Moreover, as the history of sodomy shows, the right to privacy to 
express one-self sexually has been intrinsically link to marriage. In Bowers 
v. Hardwick,
47
 the Supreme Court refused to recognize the right of 
individuals to engage in homosexual anal and oral sex. The Court did so in 
part because such a right had no connection with “family, marriage, or 
procreation.”48 While some might argue that Lawrence v. Texas49 signals 
the end of the Supreme Court’s trend of recognizing privacy and liberty 
rights predicated on the institution of marriage since the Court recognizes 
the right of adults to engage in the consensual sexual conduct of their 
preference without taking into account their marital status. Yet, it is the 
 
 
 41. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 42. Id.at 486. 
 43. Id. (emphasis added). 
 44. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 45. The Court extends the privacy to individuals only after it conceptualizes the marital couple as 
a pair of individuals, and therefore promoting the privacy of the spouses would promote the privacy of 
the couple. The Court opined: 
If under Griswold the distribution of contraceptives to married persons cannot be prohibited, 
a ban on distribution to unmarried persons would be equally impermissible. It is true that in 
Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the marital relationship. Yet the marital 
couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two 
individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup. 
Id. at 453. 
 46. Id. 
 47. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 48. Id. at 191. 
 49. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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opposite. Lawrence reaffirms the Court’s inclination to channel people 
into the established definition of marriage. The decision in Lawrence was 
possible only because the Court decided to separate the question of the 
constitutional right to engage in consensual sodomy from the question of 
same-sex marriage.
50
 If the Court merged the two of them, it would 
probably be still constitutional to outlaw sodomy, since the Court was not 
prepared to depart from their understanding that compulsory 
heterosexuality was part of the established definition of the family. The 
Court never intended to address and transform the connection between 
privacy and marriage. 
Thus, participating in the established definition of the family represents 
a special protection: less intervention from the state.
51
 If we analyze the 
case law about the state’s intrusion into family arrangements, we observe 
that being categorized under the established definition of the family 
signals which relations are good ones, and it tries to provide people 
incentives to engage in the behavior deemed normal by preventing 
interference in their private and familial lives.
52
 This privacy perk compels 
people to abandon engaging in alternative family arrangements and instead 
to enter into the preferred marriage relationship.
53
 
Similarly, Troxel v. Granville
54—a case in which a set of grandparents 
sought visitation privileges with the children of their deceased son—
illustrates how the marital relation is not only promoted as a superior 
version of the family, but as the only version possible. In Troxel, the 
Supreme Court decided that state courts must apply “a presumption that fit 
parents act in the best interests of their children”55 when considering non-
parent visitation petitions even if those petitions come from members of 
the biological extended family of the children. This decision entails the 
protection of the unequivocal definition of the family as it curtails any 
claims to create or defend family arrangements beyond the family-
marriage dyad. As Ristroph and Murray assert, “[t]hough Troxel has been 
understood as pertaining solely to the question of parental rights, it might 
also be understood as endorsing the primacy of the nuclear [marital] 
family model over claims for alternative family structures in which 
 
 
 50. Id. at 578. 
 51. Matthew Kavanagh, Rewriting the Legal Family: Beyond Exclusivity to a Care-Based 
Standard, 16 YALE J. L. FEMINISM 83, 115 (2004). 
 52. See id. at 99–114.  
 53. See Knouse, supra note 26, at 369; Ruthann Robson, Assimilation, Marriage, and Lesbian 
Liberation, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 709, 734 (2002). 
 54. 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
 55. Id. at 68. 
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extended family might play a larger role in children’s lives.”56 Hence, the 
proxy of marriage reinforces the unequivocal formulation of the family, 
even when the decisions taken by the Court are not directly asserting it.  
Decisions like these are creating inequality not only in aspects of 
Family Law, but in other areas of the law as well. By refusing to give legal 
recognition, rights and social power to the members of unconventional 
family arrangements, the legal system is promoting the creation of a 
marginalized group of people. Moreover, decisions like Troxel are 
evidence of how entrenched the familial establishment is in our system. 
Not only Family Law, but the whole system (including social relations) is 
geared by this conception. Ristroph and Murray were referring precisely to 
this inequality problem and the pervasiveness of family-normativity when 
they spoke of familial establishment. Yet, familial disestablishment does 
not seem to be in our immediate future.  
Moreover, contrary to what some jurists have argued, an alleged legal 
recognition of unconventional familial arrangements has not started to 
bring familial disestablishment to the legal reform and scholarly agendas.
57
 
Conversely, it has pushed even further the possibility of familial 
disestablishment. As Ristroph and Murray assert, the alleged departure 
from the marital family ideal by supposedly recognizing the diversity of 
family life through (a) bestowing constitutional and statutory protections 
to non-marital children and same-sex couples, and (b) conferring rights of 
cohabitation, has not meant the abandonment of the proxy marriage;
58
 
instead it has led to the perpetuation of the established definition of the 
family in a more subtle and diffuse manner.  
The cases that seem to promote an alternative way of defining the 
family fall into what has come to be known as the functional approach.
59
 
Under the functional approach, courts recognize non-marital families and 
grant rights to their members as long as those family arrangements exhibit 
the characteristics of marital families.
60
 The court first evaluates the 
longevity, commitment, economic cooperation, and participation in 
domestic relationships of the non-marital family.
61
 If the court finds that 
 
 
 56. Ristroph & Murray, supra note 5, at 1255. 
 57. See JANET DOLGIN, DEFINING THE FAMILY: LAW, TECHNOLOGY, AND REPRODUCTION IN AN 
UNEASY AGE 15–17 (1997). 
 58. Id. at 1255–56. 
 59. See Note, Looking for a Family Resemblance: The Limits of the Functional Approach to the 
Legal Definition of Family, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1640, 1640–41 (1991). 
 60. Id. at 1646. 
 61. See Matter of T.L., 1996 WL 393521 (Mo. Cir. Ct. 1996) (declaring that the courts should re-
examine the theory that a child could have only biological parents and adopt a more flexible functional 
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the unconventional family fits the marital family mold, the court then 
automatically treats the non-marital family as a marital one.
62
 However, 
this is not the recognition of alternative families, but a way of rewarding 
these less unconventional families—sometimes even unconsciously—for 
fitting into the established definition of the family despite not being a 
marital couple. 
The epitome of this kind of cases is Braschi v. Stahl Associates.
63
 In 
Braschi, the New York Court of Appeals deemed two unmarried gay men 
a family for the purposes of a rent control statute that protected the 
surviving members of the family of the deceased from being evicted from 
the house.
64
 Although the New York Court of Appeals recognized that the 
same-sex couple was not an actual couple of spouses, the court treated 
them as one and stated that they conducted their lives as spouses and 
everyone recognized them as such.
65
 Moreover, the New York Court of 
Appeals used the institution of marriage to inform their decision as to 
whether they were a family. The New York Court of Appeals relied upon 
“the exclusivity and longevity of the relationship, the level of emotional 
and financial commitment, the manner in which the parties have 
conducted their everyday lives and held themselves out to society, and the 
reliance placed upon one another for daily family services.”66 In sum, they 
based their decision on the similarities between the two men’s 
bureaucratized, monogamous relationship and that of the marital couple. 
The two men fit, for the most part, the established definition of the family, 
and thus were rewarded for it.  
Braschi and other similar cases show how the marriage proxy creates a 
hierarchy of family arrangements and promotes social inequalities. At the 
top of the hierarchy is the marital family. As Tamara Metz points out 
 
 
approach, which defined a family by determining whether a relationship shared the essential 
characteristics of a traditionally accepted relationship, such as economic cooperation, participation in 
domestic responsibilities, and affection between the parties); Graves v. Estabrook, 818 A.2d 1255 
(N.H. 2003) (concluding that a couple engaged to be married and that had lived together for seven 
years in a mutually dependent and emotionally supportive relationship was sufficient to permit 
bystander recovery for emotional harm); Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372 (N.J. 1994) (deciding that 
engaged cohabitants in a sound and strong relationship providing both parties emotional security 
sufficient for bystander recovery—family relationship is not limited to those related by blood or 
marriage); James D. Esseks, Recent Development, Redefining The Family-Braschi v. Stahl Associates, 
74 N.Y.2D 201, 543 N.E.2D 49, 544 N.Y.S.2D 784 (1989), 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 183 (1990); 
Note, supra note 59. 
 62. Note, supra note 59, at 1641.  
 63. 74 N.Y.2d 201 (1989). 
 64. Id. at 213. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 212–13. 
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“[t]he marital label designates a unique kind of ‘respect and dignity’. . . [it] 
conveys a social meaning and power that domestic partnership [and other 
relationships] never can.”67 This power, respect, and dignity emanates 
from the outmost protection and enjoyment of rights given to this 
arrangement. As a result, the state fosters the marital couple’s dignity, and 
they enjoy a higher status in society while the other family arrangements 
are treated as less valuable and are socially marginalized.
68
  
A step below, we find the arrangements that resemble the marital 
couple but for some reason do not fit fully under the rubric of the 
established family. The individuals that comprise these types of families 
enjoy some of the legal rights of the marital couple as well as some of the 
social recognition, but they are never on the same level as the marital 
family.  
At the bottom of the pyramid are those relationships that do not 
resemble in any aspect the married couple. Examples include siblings, 
elderly people living together, polygamous and polyamorous families, or 
friends in a family arrangement.  
The state conveys with this hierarchy the existence of different kinds of 
persons and families in society and ranks them on a scale of goodness. 
Married families are at the top of the pyramid and all the others are 
underneath it. The individuals from the arrangements at the bottom of the 
hierarchy are ostracized, made invisible and deprived of most rights.  
In turn, this hierarchy has a direct negative impact on the lives of the 
people who decide to conduct their family lives in an unconventional way. 
The hierarchy generates inequalities between the different family 
arrangements, which are translated later into society and the political life, 
in the same manner as Susan Okin argues that gender inequalities in the 
private sphere of the family are translated into the public sphere.
69
 
Consequently, the hierarchy produces alienation and domination; it 
ultimately subverts political and social equality, which results in an unfair 
society.  
Out of fear of that alienation, a large group of individuals opt for the 
marital arrangement and do not enter into other family arrangements.
70
 As 
 
 
 67. TAMARA METZ, UNTYING THE KNOT: MARRIAGE, THE STATE, AND THE CASE FOR THEIR 
DIVORCE 43 (2010). 
 68. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Reply, 98 CAL. LAW. REV. 731, 741 (2010). This is the reason why 
courts have begun to find that it is unconstitutional to grant the same rights to civil unions and 
marriages while denying the title of marriage (of family) to the former. Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 
864 (Vt. 1999); Lewis v. Harris, 188 N.J. 41 (2006); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).  
 69. SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE FAMILY 90–134 (1989). 
 70. See Knouse, supra note 26, at 417–19; Robson, supra note 53. 
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Carl Schneider argues, one of the major functions of the legal regulation of 
the family is to channel people into a specific type of relationship.
71
 The 
state dictates how intimate relationships should be lived and arranged by 
signaling which family arrangements are of social importance. This is 
accomplished by providing benefits and protections to the married family; 
which in turn creates alienation. Yet this process of bestowing benefits on 
a particular arrangement does not only produce an inherent unjust society 
and infringe on people’s liberty by channeling them into a particular type 
of family; it produces as well an incoherent group of norms. Furthermore, 
it has led the state to ignore, in many cases, the real principles that should 
guide legal regulation. 
The incoherent legal system that we have today is the byproduct of the 
state: (a) ignoring the social goods that are supposed to be protected in 
favor of benefiting the established family arrangement; (b) finding new 
ways to implicitly define the family; and (c) using the marriage proxy to 
channel people into this arrangement. Two types of regulation stand out in 
this respect: child support and domestic violence.  
With regard to the first type of regulation, for instance, if a child is 
seeking support from his parents to pursue a postsecondary education, in 
some states he would be able to sue them for support if they are divorced, 
but not if they are married.
72
 The offspring from married couples and those 
from divorced couples are treated differently, even though the law should 
treat them equally as the interest the statute should be protecting is the 
welfare of the children. There is no logical explanation to treat differently 
these two types of offspring who are equally situated in terms of the good 
to be promoted. However, since the state is trying to incentivize people to 
stay married or get married, the legislation is obscured by its channeling 
function.
73
 The law is not looking at the children but instead at the 
 
 
 71. See Carl E. Schneider, The Channeling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495 
(1992). 
 72. LeClair v. LeClair, 624 A.2d 1350 (N.H. 1993) (superseded by statute); Curtis v. Kline, 542 
Pa. 249 (1995); In re Marriage of Kohring, 999 S.W.2d 228 (Mo. 1999); Johnson v. Louis, 654 
N.W.2d 886, 889–91 (Iowa 2002). See also Monica Hof Wallace, A Federal Referendum: Extending 
Child Support for Higher Education, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 665 (2010); Anna Stępień-Sporek & 
Margaret Ryznar, Child Support For Adult Children, 30 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 359, 377 (2012); Douglas 
Walker, Indiana’s child-support law to change in July, THE STAR-PRESS: MUNICE, May 13, 2012. 
 73. For instance, we see in LeClair how the court incentivizes people to stay married by granting 
them the privacy perk or the non-intervention in marital affairs while at the same time granting a 
second perk by protecting the marital couple from an adverse economic obligation. The court 
articulates its rationale in the following fashion: “[d]espite our limited insight into the legislature’s 
intent, we observe that heightened judicial involvement over the financial and personal lives of 
divorced families with children may be warranted, although similar involvement may not be necessary 
with intact families.” LeClair¸ 624 A.2d at 1357. Rather than assuring the welfare of the children, the 
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established family arrangement. The state benefits the marital family by 
not meddling in the decisions of the married couple. So instead of 
protecting the welfare of the children—the real interest to be protected—
the law just furthers the established definition of the family. This creates 
an illogical regulatory scheme. Furthermore, it creates legal and social 
inequality between citizens equally situated. In that manner, we end up 
with an incoherent and unfair regulatory scheme that is not based on 
adequate reasoning. 
Similarly, domestic violence laws and their application have been 
obscured by the channeling function. In the case of domestic violence, 
victims have been denied protection or recourse solely because they were 
in an extramarital relationship with their abusers.
74
 The few courts that still 
today act in this way rely on the flawed reasoning that domestic violence 
laws have been enacted to prevent family disruption and preserve the 
institution of marriage, and those interests are not advanced by sanctioning 
and protecting someone having an extra-marital relationship.
75
 Yet again, 
the state sacrifices the real interest at stake and the harm to be avoided—
the physical and emotional integrity of the victims—in favor of channeling 
people into the established definition of the family. The state continues to 
create an incoherent and unfair regulatory scheme in which equally 
situated people are not treated equally and instead are ostracized and 
marginalized.  
Thus, familial establishment is detrimental to society for a variety of 
reasons. First, it prevents a large group of people from arranging their 
intimate relationships in alternative ways by signaling and channeling 
people into the marital family. Furthermore, by actively benefiting the 
established family, the state has created an unfair society by negating 
rights to people who decided to not follow the marital arrangement and 
arrange their family life in an alternative way. Similarly, the state has 
created a caste system based on family arrangements that disrupts society 
 
 
court is more concerned with stressing how the marital couple is a better family arrangement, because 
allegedly the marital couple does not warrant any intervention as the children will not face any 
inconveniences with their married parents, while the children from divorced or single parents will 
always face such inconveniences.  
 74. Pueblo v. Flores Flores, KLCE06 1118, 2006 WL 4062036 (P.R.TA Dec. 5, 2006), aff’d, 181 
D.P.R. 225 (Court equally divided); Woman in Extra-marital Affair Denied a Protection Order in New 
York, WOMENSLAW BLOG, July 9, 2010, http://www.womenslaw.org/blog.php.  
 75. See Flores, 181 D.P.R. at 229–50 (Kolthoff Caraballo, J. conformity opinion). This is the 
same reasoning that was often asserted to avoid interference in cases of wife beating when 
chastisement laws were abandoned. Courts permitted the aggressions in order to protect the privacy of 
the marriage relationship and to promote domestic harmony. See Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: 
Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2120 (1996). 
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in profound ways.
76
 This kind of involvement from the state has generated 
an incoherent and unfair system of regulation, which sacrifices the real 
common goods to be promoted and the real harms to be avoided. In turn, 
familial establishment subverts political and social equality, generating an 
unfair society.  
IV. THE LIBERAL PROMISE: A BROKEN VOW  
“What’s in a name? That which we call a rose by any other name 
would smell as sweet.”77 
Contemporary liberal scholars are well aware of all these problems caused 
by familial establishment. They have also shown a great understanding of 
how familial establishment infringes upon the basic tenants of liberalism. 
Yet, their proposals to tackle the problem of familial establishment do not 
fully eradicate its pernicious effects. In fact, their proposals generate the 
same problems discussed in the previous part. Some scholars even have 
been honest enough to recognize the limitations of the liberal framework.
78
 
Yet, they have not been able to abandon this paradigm and explore other 
solutions. 
There are various reasons why liberalism is insufficient to encompass 
the multiple dimensions of the problem of familial establishment. The 
main reason is that the narrative of rights constrains the scope of the 
proposals. Second, some of the proposals have obviated the fact that the 
subject of the proposed reform cannot be marriage or the family by 
themselves. Since our current legal process of granting rights to family 
arrangements is premised on using marriage as a proxy,
79
 we should not be 
talking about marriage and family separately. Instead, we should be 
focusing on the family-marriage dyad. 
These two limitations are precisely the problems with Martha 
Nussbaum’s proposal to disengage the state from granting marital status to 
a particular set of people. She challenges the regulation of marriage 
because it violates the ideals of liberalism.
80
 Nussbaum recognizes how 
marriage creates an undemocratic society that sieves and grants packages 
of rights to people based on who has access to the institution of marriage.
81
 
 
 
 76. Martha C. Nussbaum, A Right to Marry?, 98 CAL. LAW. REV. 667, 683 (2010). 
 77. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 2, sc. 2. 
 78. See Knouse, supra note 26, at 417–19. 
 79. Supra Part III.B. 
 80. See Nussbaum, supra note 76, at 685–89. 
 81. Id. 
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Yet, since she focuses exclusively on the problem of two-person same-sex 
relationships not having access to the marital label, she proposes as a 
solution offering civil unions for both same-sex and opposite-sex 
couples.
82
 Nussbaum recognizes how the current regulation of marriage 
lessens equality in today’s society, but does not weave into her theory how 
that regulation of marriage is linked to the regulation of the family and 
how it disaggregates other family arrangements. Due to her agenda, she 
instead assumes that link as a given and does not in any way attempt to 
challenge it. 
Nussbaum argues that marriage has multiple meanings: a civil rights 
aspect, an expressive aspect, and a religious aspect.
83
 She finds the second 
dimension to be highly problematic in this day and age since the state 
endorses one marital arrangement over others (meaning opposite-sex over 
same-sex marriages), and this contradicts the pluralistic ideals of the 
liberal state.
84
 She is also aware that the first dimension is problematic as 
the state administers benefits that are often given only to heterosexual 
marriages. Her solution to this inequality problem is for the state to back 
out of the expressive domain and offer civil unions for same-sex couples 
as well as to opposite-sex couples.
85
 Yet her solution only creates a new 
caste system; one that includes now bureaucratized, monogamous, 
sexuated gay married couples with children at the top. Nussbaum’s 
solution is merely a name substitution that includes more people into the 
definition of marriage and the family without really changing either. 
As Professor Pamela S. Karlan correctly points out, “to the extent that 
reform simply substitutes some other word for ‘marriage’ while continuing 
to provide special benefits to specified familial structures or organizations, 
over time the state will reenter the precise expressive domain from which 
Professor Nussbaum hopes to remove it.”86 Furthermore, as long as the 
new established definition does not challenge the idea of the 
bureaucratized, monogamous, sexuated married couple with children, we 
would still have the same unequivocal definition of the family.  
The problem with Nussbaum’s proposal is that its focus is on rights—
specifically, on giving the same rights that married couples have to other 
people in similar arrangements. As long as that is the approach, there will 
 
 
 82. Pamela S. Karlan, Let’s Call the Whole Thing Off: Can States Abolish the Institution of 
Marriage?, 98 CAL. L. REV. 697, 698 (2010).  
 83. Nussbaum, supra note 68, at 669. 
 84. Id. at 672. 
 85. Id. at 695. 
 86. Karlan, supra note 82, at 698. 
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be some people equally situated to the married couple who will not receive 
the same benefits, and the problem of inequality will still persist. 
Moreover, there will always be a vast range of familial arrangements that 
will never receive any rights just because they are a step below in the 
marital/non-marital hierarchy. More than neglecting the powerful effects 
of the expressive nature of defining the family, Nussbaum disregards in 
her analysis that the problem of inequality has its origin in the use of a 
proxy marriage to grant rights to family arrangements. That proxy 
obscures the real common goods the law should be promoting and hence, 
if the proxy is not eliminated, the inequality problem could never be 
solved. Addressing the issue from a rights perspective overlooks this 
essential fact.  
This is also Tamara Metz’s flaw in her proposal to disestablish 
marriage. Metz’s argument is that the establishment of marriage violates 
liberalism’s most basic values, and thus it must be abandoned if the state 
intends to have a coherent ideology. She claims that, by promoting an 
unequivocal version of marriage
87
 in a nation where (a) there is a strong 
disagreement about its definition, and (b) there are diverse forms of 
families co-existing, the state threatens formal and substantive equality 
through favoring one arrangement over the others.
88
 She believes this 
jeopardizes liberty because the state becomes enmeshed in the intimate 
lives of its citizens, and it imperils stability since both liberty and equality 
are endangered.
89
 Metz is also concerned with putting the state in a 
position of reproducing “deeply contested cultural, social, and religious 
norms and relations” through marriage.90  
However, Metz believes in the regulation of familial arrangements. Her 
objection is merely that the state, under the current regime, is inadequately 
securing important public welfare goals.
91
 Metz argues that even under 
liberalism the state should be involved in regulating relationships of care.
92
 
However, since caregiving “no longer takes place within the marital 
walls,”93 her contention is that “[t]he State must recognize and regulate 
intimate caregiving units to insure against the inherent risks of care, but it 
must do so in ways that neither undermine their norms of reciprocity nor 
 
 
 87. Although she does not explicitly talk about marriage as a proxy for defining the family, her 
analysis departs from an understanding of the existence of the family-marriage dyad. 
 88. METZ, supra note 67, at 7. 
 89. Id. at 7. 
 90. Id. at 32. 
 91. Id. at 14. 
 92. Id. at 10. 
 93. Id. at 11. 
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exacerbate existing inequalities.”94 Metz foresees that if this scheme of 
regulation is achieved, then freedom of expression, intimate association, 
and cultural pluralism would be protected, and equality between and 
within intimate associations would be enhanced.
95
  
Her proposal is to broaden the kind of family arrangements that can be 
regulated by the law. Yet, her proposal does not entail a shift in the 
conception of the family. In fact, the model with which she would replace 
marriage—which she denominates Intimate Care Giving Unions 
(ICGU)
96—is founded on the notions of bureaucracy, monogamy, 
sexuated relations and child rearing that characterize the definition of the 
family. Her approach is basically the same functional approach courts 
have taken and that I have criticized in Part III.C.
97
 Although Metz does 
not proffer any concrete definition of the ICGU, bureaucratization must be 
an integral part of it, since the idea of intimate care giving departs from the 
understanding that in any family arrangement there would always be a 
bureaucratization of activities: someone to be cared for and someone who 
cares for another person. Thus, she does not defy the first pillar of the 
established definition of the family. Likewise, she does not defy the idea 
of child rearing. Even though Metz proffers an example of ICGU 
relationships in which there are not any children involved, in reality the 
only instances in which she offers specific examples about the inherent 
risks of care giving that serve as a basis for the state intervention are when 
she talks about relationships in which children are in fact involved.
98
 
Similarly, the elements of monogamy and sexuated relationships are left 
pretty much intact. For instance, the legal recognition that Metz seeks for 
non-sexuated intimate relations is based on making available the kinship 
presumptions available to sexuated relationships, not in creating a new 
system that recognizes these types of relationships for what they are.
99
 
Monogamy is also left untouched. Metz envisions this regime as one in 
which the monogamous ethic would be strong enough as to sanction 
politically polygamous relations.
100
  
Thus, her proposal does not seek to defy the elements of the 
unequivocal definition of the family, but, like Nussbaum’s, it looks for a 
way to impose them into a broader range of family arrangements. Hence, 
 
 
 94. Id. at 13. 
 95. Id. at 12. 
 96. Id. at 13. 
 97. See supra Part III.C. 
 98. Id. at 127. 
 99. Id. at 135. 
 100. Id. at 141, 147. 
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what Metz proposes is not at all untying the knot (as she argues on her 
book), but changing the name of the knot. Instead of marriage, she 
proposes to change the name of what would represent the family-marriage 
dyad to ICGU. As Metz maintains “[i]n many ways, an ICGU status 
would look like marital status today.”101 
Furthermore, even if Metz’s proposal was to accommodate families 
beyond the bureaucratized, monogamous, sexuated married couples with 
children, her proposal is inadequate to bring about a coherent legal 
regulatory scheme. Her proposal does not require society to look into its 
norms and decide the real reasons for having a particular legal regulation 
instead of merely using the marriage proxy as substitute for the analysis. 
Instead, she would just replace the proxy marriage with the ICGU proxy 
and increase the number of people covered under the established definition 
of the family. Again, as it was discussed, as long as there is an established 
definition, the inequality problems would still remain the same. And once 
again, as it was discussed, what is missing from this liberal approach is the 
analysis of how marriage is used as a proxy to grant rights and exclude 
people from power.  
On the other hand, those contemporary liberal scholars that do not 
ignore this fact recognize that a conservative liberalist approach will never 
help to disestablish the family since all it can offer is mere name changing. 
For instance, Jessica Knouse insists that these rights and social 
deprivations that render society less democratic will never disappear by 
merely replacing civil marriage with another relationship-centered 
institution such as a civil union regime.
102
 Her reasoning reproduces the 
same contentions I have been articulating thus far. As long as the 
proposals do not stop privileging any of the elements of the current 
established definition of the family, familial disestablishment could not be 
achieved. Knouse focuses on the privileging of the sexual dimension of 
the definition. She points out that “[w]hen governments privilege sexual 
partners, they effectively deprive their citizens of liberty by encouraging 
them to enter sexual partnerships rather than self-determining based on 
their own preferences; they effectively deprive their citizens of equality by 
establishing insidious status hierarchies.”103 She further argues that civil 
marriage, and in turn the current unequivocal definition of the family, 
privileges not only sexual partners but also religious, patriarchal, and 
heterosexist ideologies that diametrically oppose the democratic values of 
 
 
 101. Id. at 134. 
 102. Knouse, supra note 26, at 369. 
 103. Id. at 362. 
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the Due Process, Equal Protection, Establishment, and Free Speech 
Clauses.
104
 Her contention is that while the replacement of marriage with a 
new system like civil unions or ICGU “might succeed in rendering the 
institution less undemocratic, they will not succeed in rendering it 
affirmatively democratic”105 since “[e]ven if American civil marriage 
could be stripped of its religious, patriarchal, and heterosexist aspects, it 
would remain an essentially undemocratic institution due to its inherent 
privileging of sexual partners.”106  
Inasmuch as civil marriage cannot be democratized, she advocates for 
its abolition.
107
 Knouse boldly proposes the removal of the state from the 
business of affirming sexual partnerships through marriage or any other 
similar institution.
108
 She believes that in order to foster equality, the 
government must not pass laws that establish hierarchies and must instead 
enact laws that affirmatively prohibit discrimination based on the traits 
associated with those hierarchies.
109
 Notwithstanding her radical approach, 
she foresees a post-marriage landscape in which the state does precisely 
so. Although her proposal is not so clear, she asserts that she envisions the 
state allocating benefits to individual providers rather than to sexual 
partners and allowing sexual partners to enter private contracts that would 
be enforceable to the same extent that pre-marital agreements are currently 
enforceable.
110
 
Although Knouse intends to get rid of the marriage proxy by only 
giving sexual partners access to enforceable pre-marital agreements, her 
proposal seems to require the creation of a new proxy: the provider proxy. 
Even if that proxy would not be necessary, her proposal still departs from 
an understanding that the law should have a definition of the family. In her 
case that definition is that of a provider. However, family arrangements 
are diverse, and there is a universe of arrangements in which being a 
provider does not play a part. Her unequivocal definition merely brings us 
back to the problem of familial establishment and the state privileging one 
particular arrangement over others; creating the same inequality problems 
as today. Thus, not even Knouse’s radical liberal approach to the problem 
brings us closer to a possible solution to the problems of familial 
establishment. 
 
 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 418. 
 106. Id. at 362. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 368. 
 110. Id. at 419. 
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V. A NEW PROMISE: HEGEMONY & REIFICATION AS A NEW FRAMEWORK 
MICHELE: È solo un po’ di nostalgia. 
SERRA: E di che? 
MICHELE: Forse di una banale e stupida vita normale. 
SERRA: Ma quella c’e l’hai già.111  
The problem with all these liberal proposals is that, because of their focus 
on rights, they are forced to define the family in a particular manner that 
creates a loop back to familial establishment and its problems. Moreover, 
they take for granted that the family must be legally regulated or defined 
in order for people in particular family arrangements to have legal 
protection. In doing so they ignore the pernicious effects that establishing 
a definition of the family creates.  
However, it is not necessary to have a definition of the family in order 
for people to be protected in their family relationships. The law can grant 
protections and rights based on the real interests that society wishes to 
protect, instead of doing so based on a proxy that allegedly embodies such 
interests. This would avoid familial establishment and preclude all the 
inequality problems.  
However, in order to find a way to successfully do this, we must shift 
our focus from the narrative of rights to the power struggles and 
inequalities associated with familial establishment. If we do so, we would 
be able to isolate the problems that keep channeling us back into familial 
establishment, and we would be able to break free from it and find a 
solution that will stir us in the direction to a more egalitarian society. That 
requires the abandonment of the liberalist paradigm and a move to a 
paradigm more akin to power allocations. Hegemony is such a paradigm. 
A. Current Understanding of Hegemony 
The concept of hegemony was coined and primordially elaborated by 
Antonio Gramsci. He formulated the idea of hegemony as an attempt to 
understand why the proletariat did not rebel against capitalism but instead 
 
 
 111. LE FATE IGNORANTI, supra note 9. The following is the translation of the quote: 
Michele: I’m just a bit nostalgic. 
Serra: For what? 
Michele: Maybe for a stupid and trivial normal life. 
Serra: But that you already have. 
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was often its strongest supporter.
112
 It seems only fitting that we use it to 
understand why we have not rebelled against the idea of familial 
establishment and are often its greatest promoter. 
Gramsci developed the idea of hegemony by expanding the meaning 
and application of the Marxist ideas of ideology and false consciousness. 
Specifically, Gramsci contended that the base and the superstructure, 
which Marx envisioned as two separate entities, were in actuality the two 
components of a larger structure of subordination: the historical bloc.
113
 
The historical bloc, according to Gramsci, forms a giant system that is 
internalized as “common sense” from which domination ensues.114 
In addition, Gramsci surpassed the Marxist determinism of historical 
materialism (economic analysis) by conceptualizing supremacy as a multi-
leveled phenomenon. For Gramsci, domination is never merely an 
epiphenomenon of the economic structure;
115
 he had a more nuanced 
understanding of the reasons that belies domination. His explanation 
encompassed instead all productive structures of hegemonic discourses—
that is, all the narratives that the dominant group uses to ensure 
domination, such as cultural and political institutions.  
By incorporating into his analysis the role of civil society, Gramsci 
expanded on Marx’s notions as to why and how supremacy is achieved. In 
fact, “[t]he most striking aspect of Gramsci’s formulation is his abolition 
of a strict distinction between state and civil society.”116 According to 
Gramsci, domination is not only attained by making use of the 
governmental apparatus, but also by promoting ideas and values through 
non-governmental institutions. Gramsci included in his analysis “the entire 
complex of institutions and practices through which power relations are 
mediated in a social formation to ensure the ‘political and cultural 
hegemony of a social group over the entire society.’”117 
 
 
 112. Douglas Litowitz, Gramsci, Hegemony, and the Law, 2000 BYU L. REV. 515, 522 (2000) 
[hereinafter Litowitz, Gramsci]. 
 113. ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS OF ANTONIO GRAMSCI 137 
(Quintin Hoare. & Geoffrey Nowell eds., 1971). 
 114. Id. 
 115. James P. Hawley, Antonio Gramsci’s Marxism: Class, State and Work, 27 SOC. PROBS. 584, 
588 (1979–80). “Rather, it is posited as work, resulting from [the] permanent and pervasive efforts of 
the dominant classes, secured through their control of the state, to create solidarity among the powerful 
and supra-party consensus.” Ratma Kapur & Tayyab Mahmud, Hegemony, Coercion, and their Teeth-
Gritting Harmony: A Commentary on Power, Culture, and Sexuality in Franco’s Spain, 33 U. MICH. 
J.L. REFORM 411, 416 (1999–2000). 
 116. Kapur & Mahmud, supra note 115, at 415. 
 117. Id. at 414–15 (citations omitted). 
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For Gramsci, domination is accomplished and maintained in two 
axes.
118
 These axes are not isolated from each other. To the contrary, under 
Gramsci’s formulation of hegemony, interaction between them is 
indispensable. Furthermore, in order for supremacy to ensue, not only both 
axes must interact with each other, but domination must take place also at 
both axes simultaneously.
119
  
Gramsci referred to the first axis in multiple ways: physical force, 
authority and violence.
120
 In contrast, he referred to the second axis as: 
consent, hegemony and civilization.
121
 The physical force axis is 
associated with the army, the police, the militia, the judiciary and the penal 
system, whereas the consent axis is associated with social institutions 
related to education, religion, political parties, the media and cultural 
systems.
122
 
The first axis works under a very simple premise: the subordinate 
groups’ conduct must be maintained by exercising physical power over 
them through the governmental structures of the military and the law. Yet, 
that premise does not mean that the coercion axis exists merely as a 
conditioning mechanism with no effects on the psyche of the individuals 
or that it only impacts the “public sphere.” The activities within the 
coercion axis move between the private and public realm. Likewise, such 
actions encompass dimensions of pragmatism as well as of symbolism.
123
  
On the other hand, the dimensions of the second axis are more 
complex. “It involves subduing and co-opting dissenting voices through 
subtle dissemination of the dominant group’s perspective as universal and 
natural, to the point where the dominant beliefs and practices become 
intractable component of common sense.”124 The consent axis is based on 
the creation of a hegemonic discourse that would pave the way to the 
dominated group’s embrace of the coercive actions of the ruling group 
orchestrated through the state. That hegemonic discourse is articulated by 
 
 
 118. Litowitz, Gramsci, supra note 112, at 519. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See GRAMSCI, supra note 113, at 170. 
 121. See id. 
 122. Kapur & Mahmud, supra note 115, at 412; Litowitz, Gramsci, supra note 112, at 519. 
 123. As mentioned, both levels of domination complement each other. In fact, “every instance of 
hegemony in the private sphere is backed by physical force on some level, and every act of physical 
force is also a symbolic performance and a hegemonic statement about the legitimacy of the state.” 
Litowitz, Gramsci, supra note 112, at 527. The interplay of coercion and ideology as well as of force 
and persuasion is one of the vital insights of Gramsci’s work. Kapur & Mahmud, supra note 115, at 
419. 
 124. Litowitz, Gramsci, supra note 112, at 519. 
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taking control of what Marx and Hegel denominated “civil society.”125 
Through science, religion, the media and the law, the dominant groups 
subtly promote an unequivocal vision of how people should live their 
lives. The unequivocal definition of the family is a perfect example of how 
this axis works. With the help of, for instance, bathroom signs, theologian 
formulations, and familial establishment, a specific version of the family is 
planted in our minds as the only one possible and the one to achieve.  
In other words, the basic premise of the hegemony axis is the creation 
and establishment of a ruling worldview to which everyone in society 
unconsciously subscribes and that no one even considers to defy or could 
actually challenge; for it requires a counter-hegemonic act that would 
unveil the institutionalization of practices of domination which, while 
illegitimate, are widespread even if hidden. “This explains why hegemony 
appears as a vague sensation of loss and resignation instead of a feeling of 
moral outrage: the structures that give rise to hegemony are not 
immediately visible and thus cannot be directly confronted until they are 
made manifest. . . .”126 That is the reason why the proletariat was not able 
to rebel against capitalism. It explains as well why it has been so difficult 
to advocate for familial disestablishment, because even though familial 
establishment violates the basic philosophical assumptions of our political 
system, it has remained for the most part hidden. The unequivocal 
definition of the family has only found a quiet voice of discontent, evading 
for the most part any political debate as people have taken for granted that 
this is the way it should be. It is precisely in this sense of resignation 
where the effectiveness of the system lies.
127  
Indeed, for Gramsci the power of hegemony lies in the successful 
attainment of a dominant worldview by means of hidden mechanisms. 
“[T]he real system’s strength does not lie in the violence of the ruling class 
or the coercive power of its state apparatus, but in the acceptance by the 
ruled of a conception of the world which belongs to the rulers,”128 since it 
preserves the status quo. The establishment of that ruling worldview 
requires, according to Gramsci, the mechanisms of universalization, 
naturalization, and rationalization.
129
 This three-step mechanism attempts 
 
 
 125. This corresponds to what Althusser denominated “the ideological state apparatuses.” Id. at 
531. 
 126. Id. at 514–15. 
 127. The account from my class discussion in supra Part II, vividly illustrates this sense of 
resignation hegemony produces and how difficult is to disestablish those narratives or hegemonic 
discourses that assured the ruling class’ domination. 
 128. GIUSSEPPE FIORI, ANTONIO GRAMSCI: LIFE OR A REVOLUTION? 238 (1970). 
 129. Litowitz, Gramsci, supra note 112, at 515. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol5/iss2/2
  
 
 
 
 
2013] THE CASE FOR ABOLISHING CIVIL MARRIAGE 219 
 
 
 
 
to explain the process by which the dominant group, through the law and 
other social institutions such as the media, the schools, and the church, 
forges an ideology that is embraced by the subordinate groups as the only 
one possible.  
The three-step mechanism functions as follows. First, “[b]y 
universalism, the dominant group manages to portray its parochial 
interests and obsessions as the common interests of all people.”130 By 
universalizing the needs and goals of society, the dominant group tries to 
bring the possible dissenting voices of the subordinate class into its 
agenda. Second, “[i]n the strategy of naturalism, a given way of life 
becomes ‘reified’ to the point where ‘culture’ is confused with ‘nature’ at 
every turn, which induces quietism because there is no point in fighting 
against nature.”131 In this second step, the dominant group prevents the 
subordinate groups from defying their power by naturalizing certain 
conduct, since power allocation is internalized as the way things are and 
should be. “As for the strategy of rationalization, Gramsci points out that 
every ruling group gives rise to a class of intellectuals who perpetuate the 
existing way of life at the level of theory.”132 Through this last step, the 
ruling class legitimizes its conduct. By utilizing science, law, and the 
media, the dominant group elaborates “sound” theories that justify the 
actions taken by the state and by civil society.  
Yet, it is pivotal for these processes to be successful that they be 
executed in subtle, invisible, hidden ways, so that the subordinated groups 
could not contest the hegemonic discourse and instead would consent to 
the exercise of physical force upon them. Hence, if the law is to be used to 
further control in either the physical or the hegemony axis, it is crucial that 
the law appears to be not only legitimate but also just, sound and 
predicated on rational foundations. This explains the use of the marriage 
proxy as a way of rationalizing the denial of rights and the imposition of a 
particular worldview with regard to the family, as well as the doctrine of 
the functional approach.  
Hegemony is then, “something that is largely unconscious as opposed 
to ideological belief structures that can be consciously articulated and 
 
 
 130. Id. at 525. 
 131. Id. at 526. 
 132. Id. As E.P. Thompson has mentioned: “If the law is evidently partial and unjust, then it 
masks nothing, legitimizes nothing, contributes nothing to any class’s hegemony. The essential 
precondition for the effectiveness of law in its function as ideology is that it shall display an 
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contested.”133 It is so deeply entrenched that hegemony is rarely brought 
out in the open and challenged, to the extent that it is voluntarily accepted 
and consented to by the subordinated class.
134
 Since the mechanism by 
which this acquiescence to being dominated takes place is hidden from the 
consciousness of the masses, hegemony refers to a “power that maintains 
certain structures of domination but that is ordinarily invisible.”135 The 
mechanisms of domination remain invisible, since their foundations are 
naturalized under a hegemonic discourse perpetuated by various social 
institutions.
136
  
Linking Gramsci’s formulation of hegemony to the productive 
dimension of social institutions has brought light into how domination 
ensues and power is exercised. Yet, his adherence to the Marxist ideas of 
class and a single hegemonic discourse, ruling group, and subordinate 
class could not account for the intricate power dynamics that are in play in 
familial establishment.  
Fortunately, this limited view of power relationships has been 
surpassed by subsequent thinkers. First, instead of referring to 
class/exploitation, subsequent thinkers formulate domination in terms of 
discourse/marginalization.
137
 In addition, the idea that there is only one 
 
 
 133. FIORI, supra note 128, at 238. 
 134. That is the reason why—as we will see in infra Part V.A—people whose family arrangement 
does not fit under the rubric of family-normativity accept the hegemonic discourse and try to find a 
way to fit into it rather than challenge it. 
 135. Mindie Lazarus-Black & Susan F. Hirsch, Introduction, in CONTESTED STATES 6 (Mindie 
Lazarus-Black & Susan F. Hirsch eds., 1994). 
 136. As Susan F. Hirsch and Mindle Lazarus-Black put it: 
Hegemony refers to power that “naturalizes” a social order, an institution, or even an 
everyday practice so that “how things are” seems inevitable and not the consequence of 
particular historical actors, classes and events. It tends to sustain the interest of a society’s 
dominant groups, while generally obscuring these interests in the eyes of subordinates. 
Hegemony functions in talk, silences, activities, and inaction. In other words, it is “that order 
of signs and practices, relations and distinctions, images and epistemologies—drawn from a 
historically situated culture field—that come to be taken-for-granted as the natural and 
received shape of the world and everything that inhabits it. . . . In a quite literal sense, 
hegemony is habit forming.” Hegemony operates in institutions that educate and socialize 
such as schools, the press and churches. Furthermore, . . . the educative function of law 
operates within and around legal arenas to perpetuate hegemony but also to test it limits. 
Id. at 6–8 (citations omitted). 
 137. Laclau and Mouffe are the two that best embody this view. 
For . . . [them] there is no single hegemonic center (such as class) from which all forms of 
oppression can be derived. . . . Further, there is no necessary connection between the 
marginalization experienced by various subaltern groups, so oppression can occur 
independently on several fronts along lines of gender, race, age, physical ability, and so on. 
Finally, oppression does not flow downhill from a single dominant group, but is constructed 
in a struggle of articulation between divergent forces, as each group forms its identity. 
Litowitz, Gramsci, supra note 112, at 536. 
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overarching hegemonic discourse or center of oppression has been 
replaced with the vision that there are various hegemonic discourses as 
well as various ruling and subordinate groups co-existing.
138
 The 
discussion of hegemony has become the question of multiple hegemonies 
and multiple oppressors and dominated groups.  
This approach has been criticized for not echoing the overarching 
effect of hegemony in Gramsci’s work. Litowitz, for instance, has argued 
in favor of returning to the monist approach (one overarching hegemonic 
discourse formulation).
139
 However, instead of using the class label he 
argues for its substitution for that of a code—legal institutions and 
informal norms of conduct.
140
 According to Litowitz, in the current state of 
society subordination does not come from the submission “to the will of a 
dominant class but rather to perpetuate a code [(legal institutions and 
informal norms of conduct)] that enables a dominant set of institutions and 
principles.”141 Notwithstanding the importance of this discussion,142 the 
truth is that there is consensus that subordination arises from the conflation 
of various hegemonic discourses promoted through multiple social 
institutions by numerous dominant groups.  
As it will be discussed in the next part, the formulation of hegemony as 
the conflation of various hegemonic discourses helps explain why the 
hegemonic discourse behind familial establishment has been so hard to 
isolate. Likewise, the insight attained by these later thinkers on the 
relationship between hegemony and the law is crucial for understanding 
the hegemonic forces behind family establishment and its effects.  
B. The Contours of Family-normativity
143 
 
In order to achieve familial disestablishment and avoid going back to 
the loop of defining the family, we must first identify the hegemonic 
 
 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 540. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 541. 
 142. Even if we accept Litowitz’s point, from a more practical perspective we cannot adhere to it. 
There is no way to study today hegemony effectively if we do not isolate some instances of 
domination from others. Thus, this article will adhere to the theory that there are various hegemonic 
discourses co-existing but concentrate on one of them: family-normativity. In addition, instead of 
talking about class/exploitation this article will refer to the domination in terms of 
discourse/marginalization. 
 143. This part intends only to describe the hegemonic discourse of family-normativity and its 
current effects of society. An explanation of how this hegemonic discourse was created, which were 
the historical conditions that favored it and which were the dominant groups in charge of originating it 
is beyond the scope of the present work. 
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discourse(s) that are securing an unequivocal definition of the family. 
Since hegemony is mostly a hidden process, the only way to do so is by 
examining specific occurrences where individuals or social institutions 
have actively participated in preserving, promoting or reproducing the 
hegemonic discourse(s) behind familial establishment. By studying those 
instances, we would be able to uncover that there is at least one 
unidentified hegemonic discourse behind familial disestablishment: 
family-normativity.  
This hegemonic discourse that is embodied by the family-marriage 
dyad and promoted by the marriage proxy has not been, up to this project, 
formally studied. In fact, it has not been named. However, scholars, judges 
and activists have been hinting to it without naming or even recognizing 
its existence.  
For instance, courts dealing with same-sex marriages have recognized 
that there is a special value in the label of marriage.
144
 As it was discussed, 
scholars, such as Martha Nussbaum, have been referring to that added 
value of the family-marriage dyad as the epicenter of familial 
establishment.
145
 However, they have not been able to identify exactly 
what grants married people the special kind of dignity that is not 
transferable to gay couples by granting civil unions with all marital 
rights.
146
 Similarly, thinkers and activists of alternative family 
arrangements could not understand why most people in society do not 
seem to be willing to defy such conferment even when it directly affects 
them.
147
 Family-normativity is the key for understanding that puzzle. 
Family-normativity is that added value, that special dignity that 
marriage confers to individuals. That superiority or higher position in the 
hierarchy comes as people gain social power by participating in or 
embodying the discourse of family-normativity that propels the 
established definition of the family. The new status stems from becoming 
part of the ruling group that promotes the reigning hegemonic discourse. 
As people embrace unconsciously the hegemonic discourse of family-
normativity, they then hesitate in challenging the institutions that embody 
it. Instead, they try to fit their behavior under the rubric of hegemonic 
discourse or accept the inevitability of being ostracized. This is at the heart 
of the liberal approach’s failure in counteracting familial establishment.  
 
 
 144. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). 
 145. Nussbaum, supra note 68.  
 146. Id. 
 147. Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous Existence, 
29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 277, 281 (2004). 
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Family-normativity has the four distinguishing characteristics that 
define the established family today: (a) the bureaucratization of family 
relations; (b) the promotion of two-person sexuated relationships; (c) a 
monogamous ethic; and (d) the establishment of child rearing as essential 
to human families. The bureaucratization of family relations refers to the 
idea that everyone in the family arrangement has a role to fulfill with 
specialized functions within a pre-determined hierarchy. On the other 
hand, sexuated family relations refer to the fact that the two persons at the 
top of the family hierarchy (the parents) should have a sexual relationship 
or be in position to have one. That sexual relationship should be a 
“committed” one, in the sense that it ought to be monogamous. Finally, the 
focus of the family arrangement should be raising children, independently 
of whether they are the natural product of the couple. Thus, under family-
normativity, a community of siblings, a polygamous marriage, a 
polyamorous family, or a community of persons that came together as a 
family for non-sexual reasons (such as group of college students or a 
group of elderly persons) would not constitute a valid, true, or real family 
arrangement.
148
  
Although family-normativity and its characteristics as a whole have 
eluded scholars, some of its traits have been previously isolated. For 
instance, Katharine Bartlett in an article published in 1984 identified some 
of these characteristics while trying to describe the main characteristics of 
Family Law in the United States.
149
 As Kavanagh points out, Barlett 
clustered these characteristics under the concept of doctrine of 
exclusivity.
150
 Under that doctrine, family law in the United States appoints 
two defining features to the family: (1) children have only two parents, 
and (2) parents have exclusive control over and access to children, without 
the possibility of some access, or limited control or input by other 
parties.
151
  
 
 
 148. This is not an exhaustive list of family arrangements, but an example of some of the 
relationships that are excluded today from the label of family because of the hegemonic discourse of 
family-normativity. Moreover, most of the arrangements above mentioned have been granted some 
rights or some type of recognition either by legislatures or courts. See Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Borough of Glassboro v. Vallorosi, 568 A.2d 888 (N.J. 1990); 
Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976); Turner v. Lewis, 749 N.E.2d 122 (Mass. 2001); 
Sanderson v. Tryon, 739 P.2d 623 (Utah 1987). However, none of these arrangements has received the 
same recognition or has been granted the same rights as the marital family.  
 149. Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal 
Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 897 (1984). 
 150. Kavanagh, supra note 51 at 88–89. 
 151. Id. See also Bartlett, supra note 149, at 890–99, 917–18, 936. 
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Bartlett’s theory shows how the law has incorporated the elements of 
bureaucratization, sexuated family relations, monogamy and child rearing 
of family-normativity. First, family is thought of in terms of children. 
Indeed, family for the courts in the United Sates—no matter which kind of 
family—exists to have and educate children. For instance, in In re 
Marriage Cases the court stated “the role of the family in educating and 
socializing children serves society’s interest by perpetuating the social and 
political culture and providing continuing support for society over 
generations.”152 Likewise, the Supreme Court of the United States in 
Moore v. City of East Cleveland stated that its jurisprudence “establish[es] 
that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because 
the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition. It is through the family that we inculcate and pass down many of 
our most cherished values, moral and cultural.”153 Hence, the mission and 
reason of being of the family is child rearing. 
In order to fulfill the mission of child rearing, the members of the 
family should each have a role; otherwise, the task could not be 
accomplished. That implies the bureaucratization of the family with both 
offspring producing roles as well as teaching and learning roles. Although 
the contours of the hierarchy have been transformed throughout the years, 
the hierarchy has been an indispensable element of the definition of the 
family since its inception. Like Engels argued, the meaning of the family 
has in its origins the germ of subordination and hierarchy.
154
 And even 
though the bureaucratization has changed from one associated with 
ownership to one connected with patriarchy to finally one linked to the 
power of the married couple over the children or a mix of the last two,
155
 
the idea of specialized roles and hierarchy is at the heart of family-
normativity.  
Since children are a given in the family arrangement, there should exist 
a couple capable of producing them. This is distant from the early 
formulations of the family discussed, under which it was possible to 
constitute families not based on sexual relationships or in blood or legal 
kinship. However, as Drucilla Cornell points out, today marriage enforces 
and conveys standards of a “sexuated being.”156 Cornell’s comment is of 
 
 
 152. 183 P.3d 384, 423 (Cal. 2008). 
 153. 431 U.S. 494, 503–04 (1977). 
 154. See generally FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY, PRIVATE PROPERTY, AND 
THE STATE (1884). 
 155. See Okin, supra note 69. 
 156. CORNELL, supra note 4, at 7. 
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importance because it shows how the idea of sexuated family relations is 
embedded in the discourse of family-normativity. Jessica Knouse was so 
aware of this fact that she noted how the liberal approach to substitute 
marriage with another family arrangement could never eradicate the 
requirement of a sexuated couple.
157
 Yet, she ignored that the reason lies 
in the hegemonic discourse of family-normativity. Family-normativity is 
thought of through the lens of sexuality, and thus only sexuated beings are 
believed to be capable of engaging in the creation of family arrangements.  
As the discussion above indicates, the elements of bureaucratization, 
sexuated family and child rearing are imbricated in the discourse of 
family-normativity. Monogamy is not the exception. Monogamy has been 
incorporated into the scheme of family-normativity since the early 
Catholic formulations of this model by claiming that it is needed for the 
welfare of the children and for a successful child rearing.
158
 Courts still 
today follow the same formulation.
159
 This element is so essential that the 
legal system reinforces and promotes it even at the expense of political 
pillars such as freedom of religion.
160
 For instance, as Murray and Ristroph 
correctly conclude, the Supreme Court of the United States in Reynolds v. 
U.S. was so worried that children raised in polygamous relationships 
would be ignorant of the social relations, obligations and duties that the 
monogamous arrangement teaches them that they upheld a conviction of 
bigamy even on the face of a challenge premised on the freedom of 
religion.
161
  
Moreover, monogamy is such a strong element of family-normativity 
that it has not been transformed yet as has happened with the other three. 
Polyamorous people, for instance, have not been able to modify the strict 
meaning of monogamy to include themselves under the rubric of 
monogamy and thus under the established definition of the family—as gay 
people have been able to do by including themselves under the rubric of 
parents, or even as women have done by shifting the allocation of power 
in the hierarchy. Indeed, monogamy is so vital for family-normativity that 
up to this date, in spite of a recognized fundamental right of sexual 
privacy, the federal government and some states criminalize adultery.
162
 
 
 
 157. Knouse, supra note 26, at 362. 
 158. See Witte, supra note 22. 
 159. See Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145 (1878); Sanderson v. Tryon, 739 P.2d 623 (Utah 1987). 
 160. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
 161. Ristroph & Murray, supra note 5, at 1262. 
 162. See Ala. Code § 13A-13-2 (2004); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1408 (2005); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-6-
501 (2003); Fla. Stat. ch. 798.01 (2003); Ga. Code Ann. § 16-6-19 (2004); Idaho Code § 18-6601 
(Michie 2004); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/11-35 (2011); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3507 (2003); Mass. Gen. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
226 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 5:189 
 
 
 
 
And in the case of those states that do not criminalize it, adultery has 
serious legal consequences.
163
 
All of these components of family-normativity help to create a specific 
narrative of what the family-marriage dyad must look like. That narrative 
is an essential part of the law. As Matthew Kavanagh notes, 
[f]amily law both reflects and helps create an ideology of the 
family—a structure of images and understandings of family life. 
This ideology serves to deny and disguise the way that families 
illegitimately dominate people and fail to serve human wants. 
Embedded within the ideology of the family are notions of (1) the 
kinds of roles that individual members should serve within the 
family and what they should get out of these roles, (2) the kinds of 
bonds that hold families together, (3) the actual and the proper role 
of families in society, and (4) what the state or law can and should 
do to encourage desirable family life.
164
  
The personal experience of Kavanagh illustrates how family-normativity 
is embodied in the law.
165
 Kavanagh states that had his family come in 
contact with that system, their story would have been drastically re-
written.
166
 “From a cast of several children, multiple parents, and 
innumerable other caregiving adults, the state would have stepped in to 
rewrite my family’s [Kavanagh’s] story to meet its formal model. We 
would have been a family with two children and two divorced parents.”167  
This type of rewriting has been implemented by imposing family-
normativity through the physical force axis by different means such as: 
(a) criminalizing adultery and polygamy; (b) the enforcement of heart 
balm suits; (c) imposing penalties or not giving benefits to families which 
do not fit the hegemonic model of the family like divorced couples; and 
(d) not affording legal protections in cases such as domestic violence to 
 
 
Laws ch. 272, § 14 (2004); Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.29 (2004); Minn. Stat. § 609.36 (2003); Miss. 
Code. Ann. § 97-29-1 (2004); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 645: 3 (2003); N.Y. Penal Law § 255.17 
(Consol. 2004); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-184 (2004); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-20-09 (2003); Okla. Stat. tit. 
21, § 871 (2004); R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-6-2 (2004); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-15-60 (2003); Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-7-103 (2004); Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-365 (2004); W. Va. Code § 61-8-3 (2003); Wis. Stat. 
§ 944.16 (2003); 10 U.S.C.A. § 934 (2006). 
 163. See Kerry Abrams, Marriage Fraud, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2012); Ira Ellman, The Place of 
Fault in a Modern Divorce Law, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 773 (1996); Laura A. Rosenbury & Jennifer E. 
Rothman, Sex In and Out of Intimacy, 59 EMORY L.J. 809 (2010). 
 164. Kavanagh, supra note 51, at 85.  
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 166. Id. 
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family arrangements that fall outside the family-marriage dyad. In the 
same way, family-normativity rewrites the lives of the individuals through 
the hegemony axis by the legal and religious regulation of marriage, the 
depiction of the “traditional family” in the media and in works of art, the 
institutionalization of the traditional family in the curriculum of the school 
system, and by bestowing with privileges those who follow and conform 
to the hegemonic model.
168
  
A better example to understand how family-normativity operates in the 
law by not only dictating its content but also the actions of individuals is 
the battle for same-sex marriage. Part of the gay community has been 
looking to access the power that the family-marriage dyad bestows, and 
correctly identified the special value of marriage as the place to start. 
However, a quick glance into family-normativity would reveal that they 
did not quite fit under the components of the hegemonic discourse. 
Notwithstanding this, they have been trying to fit the group under the four 
components of family-normativity, so that they are no longer part of the 
subordinated class but of the ruling one. 
First, until recent advances in technology, only heterosexual persons 
could meet the sexuated couple requirement because “sexuated” meant 
being capable of reproduction. However, with technological advances, 
today it is possible for sexuated couples not to be heterosexual. Yet, they 
must be sexuated to some extent because otherwise their role in the 
bureaucratized structure would not hold. Gay groups took advantage of 
these advancements to start shifting their position in the power hierarchy.  
The strategy was to demonstrate first that gay people were fit for 
parenting.
169
 In that way, they would have eased their road into the family-
marriage dyad, and in turn gain access to the societal and legal power 
associated with family-normativity. The second step was to show that they 
have monogamous relationships, and by so doing to demonstrate that they 
fit the model of family-normativity. Bureaucratization for gay couples was 
not a transcendental issue, since as Fran Olsen has shown, the hierarchy of 
bureaucratization of the family has experienced multiple changes that in 
 
 
 168. For instance, in 1997 there were at least 1,049 federal statutes that made reference to 
marriage in one way or the other. The great majority of that legislation conferred benefits to married 
couples. U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Defense of Marriage Act 3, 6 (1997). 
 169. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 980 (N.D. Cal. 2010); William Meezan & 
Jonathan Rauch, Gay Marriage, Same-Sex Parenting, and America’s Children, THE FUTURE OF 
CHILDREN Vol. 15, No. 2, 2005, at 97–115; Richard E. Redding, It’s Really about Sex: Same-Sex 
Marriage, Lesbigay Parenting, and the Psychology of Disgust, 15 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 127 
(2008); Alice Park, Study: Children of Lesbians May Do Better Than Their Peers, TIME MAGAZINE, 
June 7, 2010, http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1994480,00.html. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
228 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 5:189 
 
 
 
 
the end only require (a) having parents exercise their “duties” as guardians 
and (b) children to be the subject of the custodian efforts.
170
  
Thus, once gay couples started to be seen as normal (monogamous 
parents) and not any longer as queer (promiscuous individuals) the group 
was capable of fitting into the family-normativity discourse and in a 
position to start contesting other discourses such as hetero-normativity that 
have been preventing gays to gain access to other centers of power. Yet, 
the LGBT community has neither contested the hegemonic discourse of 
family-normativity nor ever intended to do so. In fact, they were looking 
for its protection in order to defy other discourses under which they would 
not ever be able to fit. That is how the narrative of embracing diversity and 
queerness was transformed to the narrative of we are just like you. This is 
also why, as it was discussed, Nussbaum’s proposal does not at all 
challenge family-normativity.
171
  
The experience with gay marriage reveals another interesting feature of 
family-normativity. For most of our history, family-normativity has been 
conflated or hidden behind other hegemonic discourses such as patriarchy 
and hetero-normativity. That is the reason why its contours have been 
mostly ignored. Its existence helps us comprehend why the members of 
certain familial arrangements such as same-sex couples have looked into 
the law for the recognition of their familial arrangement as family. While 
at the same time, they have not challenged the basic premises of that 
concept of family, but instead have conformed or modified the narrative of 
their discourses to conform to it. It also helps us understand that the real 
hegemonic force the gay communities have been trying to defy have been 
hetero-normativity and nothing else. Thus, family-normativity could lead 
us to a better understanding of other events of hegemonic contestation. It 
could also help us in understanding why family disestablishment has not 
been achieved and we still have an unequivocal formulation of the family 
even though family law has been transformed drastically in the past fifty 
years. 
Familial establishment exists today in part as a result of family-
normativity not being challenged. Therefore, before we propose a way to 
challenge this hegemonic discourse so that all the prejudicial effects of 
familial establishment could be amended, we need to understand why this 
hegemonic discourse has remained uncontested. In order to do so, we must 
 
 
 170. Olsen, supra note 11, at 8–9. 
 171. See supra Part IV. 
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understand how hegemonic discourses are contested and replaced. This 
presents a true challenge. 
C. Understanding the Interregnum 
The interregnum of hegemonies—the period in which the hegemonic 
discourse has started to lose its supremacy and the counter-hegemonic 
discourse has started to become a real antagonistic force—has not been up 
to this day an object of study or theoretical formulation. Although the 
present work does not intend to fill this theoretical void, it is imperative 
for the analysis on familial disestablishment to proffer a theoretical 
approximation of the phenomena that ensues during this period.  
First, hegemonic discourses must be envisioned as time-specific 
occurrences. For Gramsci, hegemony meant a sociopolitical situation; “a 
‘moment’ in which the philosophy and practice of a society fuse or are in 
equilibrium; an order in which a certain way of life and thought is 
dominant, in which one concept of reality is diffused through society in all 
its institutional and private manifestations. . . .”172 Yet, that moment is not 
everlasting.  
Gramsci acknowledged the capacity for hegemonic discourses to shift. 
He contemplated the capacity of people to defy such discourses and 
produce counter-hegemonic discourses, which under certain circumstances 
would become the new ruling paradigm.
173
 Gramsci denominated that 
period during which the subordinate groups create a sufficient 
revolutionary culture that is capable of producing a counter-hegemonic 
discourse powerful enough to displace the prevailing hegemonic discourse 
as the interregnum of hegemonies. 
Yet, he did not posit any account of what happens during such 
interregnum. Gramsci’s only contention regarding this issue was that 
during the interregnum, a crisis of authority ensues, which leads the way 
to a concentration of power and to unexpected behavior. He did not 
expand on these ideas. He did not explain how counter-hegemonic 
discourses are born. Gramsci did not expand either on what events lead to 
the interregnum of hegemonies or how that period ends with a new 
hegemonic discourse in power. Fortunately, other scholars have worked on 
this topic. 
 
 
 172. Gwyn Williams, The Concept of “Egemonia” in the Thought of Antonio Gramsci: Some 
Notes on Interpretation, 21 J. HIST. IDEAS 586, 587 (1960) (emphasis added). 
 173. Martin Carnoy, Education, State, and Culture in American Society, in CRITICAL PEDAGOGY, 
THE STATE, AND CULTURAL STRUGGLE 3, 16 (Henry A. Giroux & Peter McLaren eds., 1989). 
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For instance, Martin Carnoy has untangled some of the paradoxes that 
pave the way toward the hegemonic shift. The first paradox he notes is 
that we think of the subordinate groups as being alienated and in full 
conflict with the prevailing hegemonic discourses; in reality, it is precisely 
being immersed in, and to some point being in harmony with, the 
dominant group’s culture what enables subordinate groups to displace the 
established system of beliefs.
174
 The effectiveness of this strategy results 
from the fact that the “dominant group is more willing and able to accept 
influence and change from those subordinate groups that have ‘accepted’ 
dominant-group ideology.”175 Otherwise, the dominant group would 
activate all the means at their disposal to reinforce both the hegemony and 
the physical axes of their hegemonic discourses.
176
  
In addition, the strategy to code the counter-hegemonic discourse in the 
prevailing hegemonic ideology serves to recruit forces from other 
subordinate groups who are not necessarily in line with the emerging 
counter-hegemony ideology. As Carnoy mantains, “[i]n order to appeal to 
the mass of a subordinate group, counter-hegemonic movements must 
usually couch their message in some version of hegemonic ideology, and 
must use the means of hegemonic ideology.”177 In that way, they would 
gain as supporters those subordinate groups that are affected by the 
prevailing hegemonic discourse, but who have accepted blindly the 
hegemonic ideology and are not capable of defying the prevailing system 
of beliefs. 
Thus, this period is characterized, just as the hegemonic period, by a 
continuum of resistance and power. In other words, it is a period in which 
 
 
 174. Id. at 15. Carnoy goes even further as to suggest that the subordinate groups who never 
accept the dominant worldview are not capable of achieving a shift in hegemonic discourses. As he 
stresses, “[i]t is the members of subordinate groups that accept the ideological form of culture who end 
up forcing an alienated form of their influence on the business class.” Id. However, even though it is 
true that the “culture that is developed by counterhegemonic social movements is necessarily 
influenced by hegemonic ideology”, id. at 13, that does not mean that in order to produce a counter-
hegemonic discourse capable of displacing the prevailing one the new discourse must be couched in 
some version of the hegemonic ideology. Counter-hegemonic groups who do not buy into the 
hegemonic ideology can also be successful in bringing their counter-hegemonic discourse into power 
as long as their counter-hegemonic discourse is capable of producing a massive engagement in 
dialectical thinking, and that dialectical thinking is later translated into political force. 
 175. Id. at 15. 
 176. As Carnoy rightly points out, “[w]hen challenged, dominant groups will attempt to avoid 
giving in, or at least will try to absorb the challenge in a way that sharply reduces the potential effect 
of compromise on the dominant group’s capacity to make history.” Id. at 19. Thus, it is much better if 
the revolutionary message is coded in terms of the prevailing hegemony, since as Hirsch argues the 
most successful dominant group is the one whose ideology disappears the most in the domain of the 
hegemonic. Lazarus-Black & Hirsch, supra note 135, at 8. 
 177. Carnoy, supra note 173, at 13. 
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there is an ongoing interplay between coercion and ideology. Therefore, it 
is crucial in order for the hegemonic discourse to change that both 
dominant and subordinate groups engage themselves politically in “the 
arena of the contested state.”178 If for whatever reason or by whatever 
means hegemonic discourses are removed from political discussion, then 
the contestation of hegemony would not happen. In turn, the interregnum 
of hegemonies would not come into fruition and the shift in hegemonic 
ideology would not occur. 
Another conclusion that can be drawn from the scarce literature on the 
interregnum of hegemonies or the contestation of hegemonic discourses is 
that the process is a cyclical one. As Gramsci stresses, hegemony requires 
that the philosophy and practice of a society be fused or in equilibrium. 
Since a society is not a static body, but a constant array of ever-changing 
practices and beliefs, in order for the both of them to be in equilibrium 
hegemonic discourses need to be contested, transformed or replaced. 
Otherwise, the hegemonic discourse would not be in tune with the societal 
practices and beliefs, and confusion would reign over the hegemonic axes.  
While we have some insights into how counter-hegemonic discourses 
are produced, we still have not devised what the events are that take place 
once the counter-hegemonic discourse is brought into the political light 
and leads to the displacement of the prevailing hegemonic discourse and 
the establishment of a new one. Neither Gramsci nor subsequent thinkers 
posited any descriptions of this phenomenon. However, if we intend to 
elucidate how familial establishment has secured the privileged position it 
has in our society and legal system, we must proffer a tentative description 
of the processes of contestation of hegemonic discourses and shifts in 
hegemonic discourses.  
Since hegemonic discourses are time-specific occurrences, and the 
interregnum exists within a continuum of resistance and power, the events 
in the interregnum must be cyclical incidences. The first stage is the 
Establishment of the Hegemonic Discourse or as it is a cyclical process the 
Establishment of New Hegemonic Discourse. This stage is made up of two 
phases: (1) the creation of the hegemonic discourse, and (2) the 
establishment of the discourse as hegemonic by setting up mechanisms to 
institute domination as well as to maintain in place that domination. The 
mechanisms that operate during this stage have been already discussed in 
Part IV.A,
179
 so we will not go into further details. 
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 179. See supra Part IV.A. 
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The second stage is the Contestation of the Hegemonic Discourse. This 
stage has also various phases: (1) the creation of the counter-hegemonic 
discourse; (2) the emergence of the counter-hegemonic discourse into the 
political arena; (3) the gaining of supporters by the counter-hegemonic 
discourse and the loss of supporters from the hegemonic discourse; (4) the 
contestation of the hegemonic discourse; and (5) the resistance to the 
contestation by the dominant groups. The first phase comes about as the 
oppressed groups start to feel the strain of the hegemonic power and 
realize that the reified notions that have been subtlety imposed upon them 
are nothing less than a social construct that can be changed. As I will 
discuss in the next part, in order for that to happen, subordinate groups 
must have the opportunity to engage in dialectical thinking. Otherwise, the 
second stage would not begin. After dialectical thinking has taken place, 
subordinate groups must bring their counter-hegemonic discourse to the 
political realm and attack the hegemonic discourse. The dominant groups 
would then try to strengthen the axes and the phase of resistance would 
begin. If the latter are successful, the next stage would not take place; but 
if the dominant group is unsuccessful in strengthening the axes, the 
debunking of the hegemonic discourse would occur. The last stage of the 
cycle would then begin. 
The last stage of the process of contestation of hegemony is the 
Debunking of the Hegemonic Discourse. The phases of this stage overlap 
to some extent with the ones of the first stage. During this stage, four 
events take place: (1) the overcoming of the resistance by the counter-
hegemonic forces; (2) the total loss of supremacy by the prevailing 
hegemonic discourse; (3) the replacement of the previous hegemonic 
discourse with the counter-hegemonic discourse as the new hegemonic 
discourse; and (4) the institution in power of the new discourse by setting 
up mechanisms to put in place and maintain the new found power. After 
the process of resistance starts, the counter-hegemonic groups need to 
regroup and gather more forces in order to overcome the strategies of the 
dominant group to preserve their hegemonic power. Once they have 
eradicated the institutions that reinforce the previous hegemonic discourse 
or have changed the reified notions that those institutions used to promote, 
they are able to establish their counter-hegemonic discourse as the new 
hegemonic discourse. After that, the phases of the first stage are repeated.  
As it can be reckoned, two mechanisms operate at the center of the 
interregnum: political discussion and reification. These two feed into each 
other and act also independently. It is vital to understand their relationship 
to uncover the reasons why family-normativity has not faced any 
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successful contestation and thereby move toward familial 
disestablishment. 
D. Current Understanding of Reification 
1. Reification and Political Discussion 
The concept of reification was developed by Georg Lukács to explain 
the process by which we confuse the natural world with the social 
world.
180
 Lukács theorized that the basis for reification is “that a relation 
between people takes on the character of a thing and thus acquires a 
‘phantom objectivity’, an autonomy that seems so strictly rational and all-
embracing as to conceal every trace of its fundamental nature: the relation 
between people.”181 A simple way to put it is that reification occurs when 
a social construct is treated as something fixed and unchangeable. 
Lukács envisioned two sides to reification: an objective one and a 
subjective one.
182
 On the objective side, the social constructs that we 
create are taken as natural and inevitable.
183
 Conceptualizing marriage as 
something natural instead of as a social construct is the epitome of the 
objective side of reification. 
Whereas on the subjective side the individual is estranged from himself 
and is no longer a free creative person, instead he sees himself as a mere 
commodity to be bought and sold by others.
184
 Transcending this narrow 
Marxist formulation, the subjective aspect of reification is nothing less 
than the loss of individual agency as we “willingly” become subjects of 
the reified idea. In other words, in the subjective side we lose our capacity 
to contest the institutions that promote and preserve the reified ideas. This 
aspect of reification shows itself when the groups that have been denied 
the opportunity of participating of the family-marriage dyad, such as gay 
couples or polyamorous families, instead of contesting the hegemonic 
ideas have sought to be legally legitimized under the rubric of marriage by 
conforming to what the discourse of family-normativity demands. 
Reification, thus, aids the dominant group to conceal hegemonic 
discourses and its unequal power allocation. Once that happens, we lose 
 
 
 180. Douglas Litowitz, Reification in Law and Legal Theory, 9 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 401, 401 
(2000) [hereinafter Litowitz, Reification]. 
 181. Georg Lukács, Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat, in HISTORY AND CLASS 
CONSCIOUSNESS 83 (Rodney Livingstone trans., MIT Press 1971) (1968). 
 182. Litowitz, Reification, supra note 180, at 408. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
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our capacity to see that there are alternatives to the social constructs 
promoted by dominant groups. In turn, we lose our ability to contest the 
reified notions hidden in the hegemonic discourses. In other words, 
“[r]eification implies that man is capable of forgetting his own authorship 
of the human world, and further, that the dialectic between man, the 
producer, and his products is lost to consciousness.”185 It was precisely this 
loss of dialectical thought that was Lukács’ main concern with 
reification.
186
 Thus, the decisive question when it comes to reification is 
whether one can still remain aware that our social institutions are a human 
creation and, therefore, can be reinvented. 
Since reification is an unconscious process, it can only be overcome if 
it “is brought into full view of the critical, conscious mind.”187 The first 
step in the process of overcoming reification is to identify that there is a 
reified notion being taken for granted. After we acknowledge that fact, 
then “reification must be unlearned.”188 Lukács argued reification can be 
overcome by engaging in dialectical thinking.
189
 By dialectical thinking, 
Luckács meant that we should be “consciously active participant[s] in the 
construction of a social world” by refusing to reconcile our analysis with 
what is given in our culture;
190
 moreover, that we should transcend those 
givens and even negate them.
191
 “If one realizes this, one returns to oneself 
as an active agent and the reified institutions are turned back into social 
relationships.”192 
To arrive to those conclusions, we must compare our reified notions to 
alternative arrangements, both real and imagined.
193
 This would reveal 
“the artificial nature of the world that has become our home, pulling back 
the veil on the seeming naturalism and universality that surrounds us, by 
 
 
 185. PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF A REALITY: A 
TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 82 (1966). Another helpful formulation is that of Gabel. 
He envisions reification not as a “simple a form of distortion but also a form of unconscious coercion 
which, on the one hand, separates the communicated or socially apparent reality from the reality of 
experience and, on the other hand, denies that this separation is taking place.” Peter Gabel, Reification 
in Legal Reasoning, 3 RES. L. & SOC’Y 25, 26 (1980). This notion also points out to the unconscious or 
unintended nature of the process that has to be overcome if reification is to be challenged and the 
hegemonic discourses to be disrupted. 
 186. Litowitz, Reification, supra note 180, at 409. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 411. 
 190. Anthony J. Fejfar, An Analysis of the Term “Reification” as Used in Peter Gabel’s 
Reification in Legal Reasoning, 25 CAP. U. L. REV. 579, 603 (1996).  
 191. Litowitz, Reification, supra note 180, at 411. 
 192. Id. at 410. 
 193. Id. at 403.  
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making us less comfortable with our established institutions and 
practices.”194 In other words, the solution for overcoming reified social 
constructs is to engage in a critical project of demystification. 
Demystification “involves identifying and questioning the models of 
selfhood and human nature that lay unannounced and below the law, but 
which nevertheless define the narrow parameters of legal doctrine.”195 
This would unleash “a feeling or irony towards one’s local practices and 
institutions”196 and a willingness to be pragmatic and try new 
arrangements.
197
 
However, before we could engage in that demystification project we 
must correctly identify what is the discourse that has been reified and has 
made us lose our agency and prevent us from achieving familial 
disestablishment. Thus far, I have identified family-normativity as one of 
those reified discourses. The monogamous, sexuated, hierarchical, child-
producing family has been taken as natural when in fact it is merely a 
social construct. As it was discussed in Part III,
198
 Article 16 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights shows how entrenched this notion 
is in our society when it states that “[t]he family[-marriage dyad] is the 
natural and fundamental group unit of society. . . .”199 
Yet, family-normativity by itself could not account for our loss of 
agency when it comes to defying familial establishment. There must be 
something else besides the notion of family-normativity making us feel 
that we should not challenge the idea of the monogamous, sexuated, 
hierarchical, child-producing family. As the discussion in Part IV
200
 seems 
to suggest that something else lies within the law. We seem not to be able 
to think of family arrangements without their legal regulation or definition. 
It is as if we not only take for granted family-normativity but also that it is 
natural for family arrangements to be legally regulated. 
Article 16 of the Declaration of Human Rights confirms this notion. 
Article 16 emphasizes the reified idea that familial arrangements must be 
legally regulated when it states that we “have the right to marry and to 
found a family”201 and that the family “is entitled to protection by society 
 
 
 194. Id. at 406. 
 195. Id. at 419. 
 196. Id. at 414. 
 197. Id. 
 198. See supra Part III. 
 199. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 27 (emphasis added). 
 200. See supra Part IV. 
 201. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 27 (emphasis added). 
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and the State.”202 This idea that familial arrangements must be legally 
regulated is what is precluding us from contesting family-normativity. 
Since we believe that it is natural for the family to be legally regulated and 
that family-normativity is a given, people in alternative arrangements only 
attempt to find a way to fit into the rubric of the law instead of defying the 
current scheme of regulation. The perfect example is the same-sex 
marriage movement. This reification of the law is precluding us also from 
really engaging into radical proposals such as truly abolishing civil 
marriage. The idea that family arrangements must be legally regulated is 
what doomed to failure all the liberal proposals discussed in Part IV,
203
 
including Knouse’s bold one of abolishing civil marriage. 
2. Reification and the Law 
If we intend to challenge the notion that family arrangements ought to 
be legally regulated, we must first understand how reification works 
within the law. This presents a challenge, since “[l]ittle scholarship has 
been devoted exclusively to reification as a problem within the law.”204 
Nonetheless, some scholars have started to make some conceptual 
approximations into the phenomenon. 
For instance, Ewik and Silbey maintain that reification of the law 
occurs when the individual develops a mistaken perspective that the law is 
transcendent, objective, and neutral.
205
 On the other hand, Litowitz 
maintains that reification as applied to law is a “kind of infection within 
legal doctrine and legal theory because it is essentially an error, a delusion, 
and a mystification that blinds people to alternative legal arrangements by 
‘naturalizing’ the existing legal system as inevitable.”206 Thus, reification 
of the law is basically the belief that having a legal system or a particular 
legal regulation is inescapable. Gabel, on his part, contends that such a 
particular belief about the law “derives not from mere indoctrination, but 
from a desire to reify, a desire to believe that the abstract is concrete, that 
the imaginary is real.”207 
My contention, however, is that such a desire could only be the by-
product of a successful past strategy to shield and strengthen a particular 
 
 
 202. Id. (emphasis added). 
 203. See supra Part IV. 
 204. Litowitz, Reification, supra note 180, at 402. 
 205. PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM 
EVERYDAY LIFE 77–82 (1998). 
 206. Litowitz, Reification, supra note 180, at 401. 
 207. Gabel, supra note 185, at 45. 
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hegemonic discourse by means of the law as a defense mechanism against 
some type of contestation. The hegemonic discourse and the law become 
so uncontested that individuals cannot seem to be able to operate outside 
the legal system and the hegemonic discourses. The shielded hegemonic 
discourse becomes so entrenched in the law that individuals cannot 
imagine a life without the conduct linked to it being legally regulated. 
As Litowitz points out “[w]hen a legal system has developed to the 
extent that it is not only repressive but productive, the individual’s 
submission no longer takes the form of simply cowering before a punitive 
state apparatus, but instead takes the milder form of working within the 
existing legal framework through everyday operations.”208 In other words, 
when the law is part of the hegemony axis, individuals are forced into the 
idea that any transformation of the hegemonic discourse must occur within 
the law. However, by doing so the dominant groups ensure, as it will be 
shown in the next part, that the hegemonic discourse is never contested. 
This type of reification of the law can be a significant hurdle in the 
process of contestation. Since all the answers are to be found in the law, 
the process diminishes our sense of agency and capacity for contestation. 
Reification of the law makes people unable “to see an alternative to the 
current arrangement, with the result that their reasoning capacities 
operated only as an instrument for getting from point A to point B within 
the system, without questioning the rationality of the entire system.”209 
The individuals overestimate the role of the law and perceive the legal 
system as the most viable option for the transformation of the hegemonic 
discourses. This perspective overlooks the fact that certain behavior is 
beyond the scope of the law. Yet, the hegemonic discourses that need to be 
contested remain hidden by the very condition that they are attached to the 
law, and the individuals believe that life cannot exist without legal 
regulation and that the solution for transforming the hegemonic discourses 
lies within the law. 
Since “[l]aw is a code that is self-referring, self-legitimating and very 
difficult to subvert because it forms a closed system any given time,”210 
the legal system serves to cover the hegemonic discourses; disassociating 
individuals from the ideas that control them. As a result, hegemonic 
discourses are no longer seen as human products but merely as by-
products of the law washing away our accountability with regard to the 
inequalities generated by the former. The process consequently diminishes 
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our sense of agency and capacity for contestation, since changes are no 
longer seen as challenges to ideological enterprises but merely as trivial 
legal reforms. 
As Litowitz points out, when this happens we are confronting deep-
structure reification. “Deep-structure reification is particularly insidious 
because it lies below the law, so it cannot be detected simply by looking at 
legal doctrine.”211 When hegemonic discourses are so enmeshed with the 
law like this, it is difficult to break away from them. Hegemonic 
discourses remain hidden by the reification of the law and all the efforts 
are directed only to making legal changes. This forecloses dialectical 
thinking, as it removes the hegemonic discourse itself from the political 
debate which is required for hegemonic contestation.  
Family-normativity has been the subject of this process of deep-
structure reification. The reified idea that family arrangements must be 
legally regulated has removed family-normativity from political debate, 
and consequently from contestation. In turn, we have been left with 
familial establishment. 
E. The Contours of the Reified Idea that Family Arrangements Must Be 
Legally Regulated 
The reified idea that the family must be legally regulated is the by-
product of the contestation of the hegemonic discourse of patriarchy 
conflated in the family-marriage dyad. As the coercion and hegemony 
axes were weakened from the multiple contestation processes defying the 
subordination of women, the dominant groups were forced to come up 
with strengthening strategies to reinforce such hegemonic discourses. The 
dominant groups chose as one of their strategies to reinforce the consent 
and physical axes in the family-marriage dyad.  
1. Depoliticizing the Family 
The strategy was to depoliticize the family—notwithstanding its 
inherent political nature—as an attempt to remove the hegemonic 
discourse of patriarchy from the political discussion and shield it from 
contestation. Yet, the dominant groups were only able to remove family-
normativity from the political debate, since the core hegemonic discourse 
in the dyad is family-normativity and not the subsidiary hegemonic 
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discourse of patriarchy. The strategy, thus, failed with respect to the latter. 
However, it effectively shielded family-normativity from contestation. 
This strategy was possible with the advent of liberalism. Liberalism 
started transforming the family-marriage dyad from a political entity into a 
non-political one. This change brought the most profound event of 
subordination and exclusion associated with the family: the reification of 
the legal regulation of family arrangements.  
Before liberalism, the family-marriage dyad was conceptualized as an 
essential element of political life. For instance, Rousseau conceptualized 
the family as the center of all political activities.
212
 For him, the family is 
the example of the first model of political societies.
213
 He even justified 
the political subordination of women based on the political nature of the 
family. Rousseau asserted that women could be governed within the 
family by their husbands and that they can be denied the opportunity to 
participate in the political sphere since their husbands can serve as their 
representatives; their participation in the family replaced the political 
participation that women were missing.
214
  
In the same manner, Locke takes the family as the starting point for his 
formulation of a political society.
215
 In Locke’s conception, the man 
appears again as the center of power over the wife, the children and the 
slaves.
216
 The idea of the father being the center of political power is also 
the notion behind Robert Filmer’s theory of the patriarchal state and the 
justification for the natural authority of the sovereign.
217
 Lastly, we can see 
also in the works of Hobbes and Marx how the formulations of a political 
state are inherently linked to the idea of the family.
218
 
For pre-liberal thinkers, thus, the family was conceptualized as an 
“unequivocal natural event” that bore relations of subordination. With 
time those relations became highly contested, as patriarchy was defied 
publicly. Likewise, the idea of the family as a natural political event was 
rejected with the emergence of liberalism. The coincidence of these two 
 
 
 212. The political nature of the family has been recognized since the Classical era. For instance, 
Aristotle stated that all the states are conformed by families. Witter, supra note 22, at 47–63. 
 213. See JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1762). 
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epicenter of patriarchy contestation. 
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last events brought a profound conceptual shift with regard to the family-
marriage dyad: the removal of family-normativity from political debate. 
First, liberal theorists discarded from their political theories the idea of 
the natural. However, it was precisely because the family was thought of 
as a natural event that the family was recognized as a political institution 
by pre-liberal thinkers.
219
 That shift meant, thus, that under liberalism the 
family was also discarded as a political entity.  
The dominant groups during the advent of liberalism foresaw in this 
philosophical shift an opportunity to counter the ongoing contestation of 
patriarchy. By removing from the political debate what they thought to be 
the central institution to patriarchy (the family-marriage dyad), they 
sought to strengthen the hegemonic discourses that were losing terrain 
through a re-conceptualization of the power relations within the family. As 
a consequence, the family became depoliticized, privatized, and its 
regulation reified.  
The family was so depoliticized by liberal thinkers that most of them 
do not even speak of it. Those who do, move basically between two 
positions. The zenith of those two positions is that the family has merely a 
subsidiary political role. Whereas the nadir is that the family does not have 
any political dimension. 
Rawls, for instance, regarded the family in the best of cases as merely 
tolerable.
220
 In reality, for him the family most of the time is an obstacle in 
the project of justice.
221
 Rawls envisioned the family as a place where 
citizens learn their moral duties, but only in the most rudimentary way. 
For Rawls, it is not possible to apply the principle of fair equality of 
opportunity within the family since the benefits of inheritance disrupt the 
principle of meritocracy.
222
 For him, the family had no-political 
dimension. 
On the other hand, Nisbet considered the family to be a buffer for the 
citizens with regard to the powers the state exercises over them. Hence, the 
family has political value but only as long as it serves citizens to resist 
interventions from the state. In other words, the family is not an 
independent political entity but a subsidiary one that serves the isolated 
individual to achieve one of his political goals.
223
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Thus, under liberal theories, even in the rare instance that the family is 
deemed to possess some political dimension, the family is not capable of 
being a political entity. These ideas permeate current Family Law 
jurisprudence. They are the motor behind the reified notion that family 
arrangements must be legally regulated. For instance, the Supreme Court 
of the United States seems to struggle with the political dimension of the 
family in its decision in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,
224
 as the Court 
takes for granted the idea that the family must be legally regulated.  
Belle Terre is one of those rare instances in which the Supreme Court 
has had the opportunity to examine a law explicitly defining the family.
225
 
Even though the case is very telling with regard to family-normativity, it is 
not Justice Douglas’ decision to uphold the constitutionality of the law on 
grounds of family-normativity what makes this case notable.
226
 Rather, it 
is the undertones of the majority’s decision and the dissent of Justice 
Marshall with regard to the family not being a political institution that 
makes the decision worth examining. It serves to illustrate how the 
depoliticized family is behind the reified notion that the family must be 
legally regulated.  
Justice Marshall in his dissent in Belle Terre states:  
My disagreement with the Court today is based upon my view that 
the ordinance in this case unnecessarily burdens appellees’ First 
 
 
 224. 416 U.S. 1 (1974). 
 225. As it has been discussed, the family has been defined socially, legally, politically and 
philosophically in a very diffuse manner, usually by making reference to marriage. Belle Terre is so a 
unique case because in this case, unlike Griswold, Loving, Reynolds, Pierce and the rest of the cases 
cited in this article that touch upon the definition of family, the Court was confronted with a statute 
that explicitly defined the family.  
 226. The case was about a zoning ordinance that restricted land use to one-family homes. The 
statute had two definitions of family: (1) “[o]ne or more persons related by blood, adoption, or 
marriage, living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit, exclusive of household servants”; 
and (2) “[a] number of persons but not exceeding two living and cooking together as a single 
housekeeping unit though not related by blood, adoption, or marriage”. Id. at 2. The constitutionality 
of the statute was challenged by the owners of a house in Belle Terre that was being occupied by six 
college students. The main contention of the plaintiffs was that the statute was arbitrary since it only 
recognized as a family of non-related persons a household comprised of a maximum of two persons. In 
the voice of Justice Douglas, the Court decided that the case did not involve any fundamental right 
guaranteed by the Constitution, id. at 6, and that it was within the power of the State to make 
distinctions between family arrangements in order to preserve “family values”. Id. at 9. 
 Thus, the case tells us something very interesting about the dominant worldview of the family. It 
seems for the Court that the definition proffered by the ordinance embodies what they think to be the 
hegemonic view of the family. That hegemonic view is the idea of two sexuated individuals capable of 
entering into a procreative or child rearing relation. That is the reason why Justice Douglas upholds the 
constitutionality of the statute. His justification for the decision is the reified reasoning of “family 
values”, which are to be taken as natural and not open to contestation, and that means that the statute 
fitted the model of family-normativity. 
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Amendment freedom of association and their constitutionally 
guaranteed right to privacy. Our decisions establish that the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments protect the freedom to choose one’s 
associates. Constitutional protection is extended, not only to modes 
of association that are political in the usual sense, but also to those 
that pertain to the social and economic benefit of the members. The 
selection of one’s living companions involves similar choices as to 
the emotional, social, or economic benefits to be derived from 
alternative living arrangements.
227
  
Justice Marshall attempted in his opinion to advocate for a broader 
conception of the family, but if we read his opinion carefully we would be 
able to see that he failed in doing what he needed to do in order to 
disestablish the family. He timidly suggests that people should have the 
freedom to decide who their family is, yet he never advocates for a 
deregulation of the family or a broad recognition of family arrangements. 
He could never do such a thing, because it is impossible to do so when his 
argument shares all the assumptions in the current legal discourse of the 
family. To do so would contravene the system’s internal structure as it 
requires recognizing the family as a political entity.  
This contradiction in Justice Marshall’s dissent surfaces when he states 
that the Constitution protects associations that are not political in the usual 
sense, which implies that the family is a political entity of some sort. Yet, 
he recognizes the lack of logical coherence in his argument and decides to 
abandon this point of the family as a political entity, and starts to present 
equal protection claims, privacy concerns, and to point out fallacies within 
the statute in order for him to further his argument for a broader 
conception of the family. Presenting the family as a political entity 
contravenes an internal dogma of the law. If Justice Marshal were to be 
able to make the argument that the family was a political entity, it might 
have been possible for him to contest the hegemonic discourse of family-
normativity. 
However, the liberal, non-political, conception of the family precludes 
contestation because it is the basis for the reified notion that family 
arrangements must be legally regulated; which in turn, has allowed family-
normativity to remain hidden and has not permitted to bring to the political 
arena any counter-hegemonic discourses. Belle Terre is the perfect 
example of that lack of counter-hegemonic discourses and its pernicious 
effects. Liberalism itself is part of the reason why we have not been able to 
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contest familial establishment as it paved the way for the reification of the 
idea that family arrangements must be legally regulated. The reification 
process that was triggered by depoliticizing the family in liberal thought 
and the resistance to the contestation of patriarchy was executed in two 
stages: (1) the privatization of the family;
228
 and (2) the juridification of 
the family.
229
 
2. The Privatization of the Family 
During the first stage, the liberal ideas of the family were incorporated 
into the law. The family started to transition from a public institution in 
which the state was openly involved to a private institution in which the 
state continued to be heavily involved, but in a subversive manner. Anne 
C. Dailey identified the beginning of this period in the United States 
jurisprudence in the 1920s
230
 when the Supreme Court decided the cases of 
Meyer v. Nebraska
231
 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters.
232
 Those cases 
symbolize the birth of the practice of not intervening in the marital family 
as a way to benefit it and channel people into it.
233
 The Court recognized 
the rights of parents to decide about the education of their children without 
the state’s intervention.234 They based their decision on the rationale that 
the family was not a political entity but a private institution.
235
 This liberal 
conception of the family as non-political started to be replicated in the law. 
For instance, decisions such as Griswold and Eisenstadt copied that 
rationale and reinforced the notion of the family as a private entity that is 
beyond state intervention.
236
 
That legal change brought a shift in the mentality of the citizens, who 
felt confident that the state would not interfere with the privacy of the 
 
 
 228. The privatization of the family comprises two dimensions: (1) the conceptualization of the 
family as a private institution; and (2) its formulation as a non-political entity.  
 229. The juridification of the family refers to the increased use of the law to resolve issues related 
to the family as well as to the exclusive control the law exercises over defining the family. 
 230. Anne C. Dailey, Constitutional Privacy and the Just Family, 62 TUL. L. REV. 955, 970–71 
(1992). 
 231. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 232. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 233. Although the privatization of the family could be traced in the United States to the 
Reconstruction Era when jurists began “justifying the new regime of common law immunity rules in 
languages that invoked the feelings and spaces of domesticity,” Siegel, supra note 64, such 
privatization of the family was never intended to benefit the marital family or as a way to channel 
people into it. 
 234. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400; Pierce 268 U.S. at 534–35. 
 235. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400; Pierce 268 U.S. at 534–35. 
 236. See the discussion of these two cases in supra Part III.C.  
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family. With that assurance, enforcing family-normativity in the physical 
axis became easier, because there was no political accountability for doing 
so. Moreover, as the family was pushed into the private realm, this era was 
also characterized by a dearth of theory on the family that made it easier to 
enforce family-normativity in the consent axis. With no class producing 
any theoretical work capable of counteracting the hegemonic discourse, 
there was an increment in subordinating legal practices. Dominant groups 
started creating legal rules to defend and strengthen the family-marriage 
dyad and its hegemonic discourse of family-normativity.  
3. The Juridification of the Family 
A crucial event in the above process was the creation of the 
constitutional right to marry.
237
 By doing so, dominant groups achieved 
familial establishment. As those groups are the ones who control the state 
apparatus, they guaranteed with the right of marriage the promotion of an 
unequivocal definition of the family. The right to marry strengthened 
family-normativity and cut the possibilities for its contestation by giving 
dominant groups exclusive control over how to legally define the family-
marriage dyad. In turn, the constitutional right to marry gave them control 
over both the hegemonic and physical axes of family-normativity and the 
tools to enforce a unique worldview of the family.  
With individuals relying on the idea of the family being a private 
institution and the constitutional right of marriage embodying such notion, 
familial establishment passed almost unnoticed and without any 
contestation. Individuals embraced the alleged non-interventionism in 
family matters that the constitutional right of marriage represented without 
realizing that they were embracing the parochial interest of the dominant 
groups. Moreover, the possibilities to challenge familial establishment and 
family-normativity were further diminished as the constitutional right to 
marry opened up as well the door for the juridification of the family. And 
with that final event in the legal history of the family, the reified notion 
that the family must be legally regulated was finally set.  
The term juridification refers to a multiplicity of actions associated 
with the legal regulation of certain situations or conducts. Among those 
actions figure an increase on solving political problems utilizing legal 
norms; the proliferation of statutes or court decisions; the prominence of 
the legal system to resolve a greater amount of problems; the expectation 
 
 
 237. This constitutional right was recognized in the United States in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 
(1967). 
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to conform to legal norms both in public and the private sphere; and the 
attribution of greater power to the legal system and its actors.
238
 When any 
of those events happen, individuals come to think of themselves as mere 
legal subjects and start giving value to the social practice of the Law and 
value themselves only when they are engaged in the practice of law. In 
other words, reification ensues.
239
  
As a result of reification, individuals overlook the fact that certain 
behavior is beyond the scope of the law. Instead they operate exclusively 
through the law, and in turn their agency is diminished. Since all the 
answers are to be found in the law, the process diminishes our sense of 
agency and capacity for hegemonic contestation. Reification of the law 
makes people unable “to see an alternative to the current arrangement, 
with the result that their reasoning capacities operate only to get them 
through the system without questioning the rationality of the system.”240 
The individuals overestimate the role of the law and perceive the legal 
system as the most viable option for the transformation of the hegemonic 
discourses. Yet the hegemonic discourses that need to be contested remain 
hidden by the very condition that they are attached to the law, and the 
individuals believe life cannot exist without legal regulation and that the 
solution for transforming the hegemonic discourses lies within the law. 
This loss of agency in regard to family-normativity started with the 
creation of the constitutional right of marriage. After marriage was 
constitutionalized, a real explosion in the regulation of the family ensued. 
As noted, up to 1997, in the federal system alone there were more than 
1,049 statutes regarding marriage.
241
 As the legal regulations exploded, the 
legal system gained more prominence in the promotion of the family-
normativity discourse under the disguise of the regulation of the family-
marriage dyad. The family became jurified. 
After such a juridification of the family, individuals from all walks of 
life started to believe that the family must be legally regulated and defined. 
We are not able to imagine a world in which the family is not legally 
defined. In turn, we look to the law as a way to eradicate the 
inconsistencies and inequalities created by family-normativity, but which 
have been perpetuated through the same institution we believe must be 
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Juridification, 4 J.L. & SOC’Y 506 (1995). 
 239. See supra Part V.D, for a discussion on how reification works. 
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used to achieve equality. The regulation of the family has become so 
reified that we are unable to engage in dialectical thinking and consider the 
existence of family arrangements outside a legal scheme. Instead we are 
stuck in a vicious circle perpetuated by the reified idea of the legal 
regulation of family-arrangements that lead us to propose an unequivocal 
definition that would create the same problems of the current one. This 
idea is what has most affected our capacity to contest family-normativity 
and has led to failure all the attempts to create equality. 
As it was pointed out in Part IV, this reification and its effects have 
reached even the proposals to transform the legal concept of marriage 
made by legal scholars. Their proposals exist within the realm of the law; 
they cannot conceive the existence of family arrangements outside of a 
legal scheme.
242
 For instance, Metz’s proposal still has at its core the state 
regulating family arrangements through the ICGU.
243
 The same happens 
with Knouse’s proposal to abolish marriage, as she advocates at the end 
for the state to regulate the family through the provider proxy.
244
 Thus, 
they do not challenge the idea of family-normativity as the latter is 
imbricated in the notion that family-arrangements must be legally 
regulated. So, familial establishment and inequality are left untouched.  
Even those scholars who recognize that the legal regulation of the 
family focuses on the two canonical relationships of marriage and 
parenthood (in other words family-normativity) cannot break away from 
the idea that there must be a legal regulation and definition of the 
family.
245
 Therefore, they too fail in their attempt to disestablish the 
family. The reified idea of family arrangements needing to be legally 
regulated is so pervasive that we are left in every attempt to challenge 
familial establishment with a new version of it and the perpetuation of 
inequality. 
VI. A VOW TO EQUALITY: ABOLISHING CIVIL MARRIAGE 
SAMANTHA: Why does everybody have to get married and have 
kids? It’s so cliché!246 
 
 
 242. See Knouse, supra note 26; METZ, supra note 67; Nussbaum, supra note 68. 
 243. See METZ, supra note 67. 
 244. See Knouse, supra note 26. 
 245. See Jill Hasday, Siblings in Law, 65 VAND. L. REV. 897 (2012) (recognizing that legal 
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advocating for the same type of regulation for non-canonical family relationships). 
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A. The Solution to Familial Establishment 
The only way to transform our current fixed and unequivocal 
conception of the family and move toward a more egalitarian society is to 
transcend the two unacknowledged phenomena of family-normativity and 
the reification of the legal regulation of family arrangements. In order to 
do so, we must engage in dialectical thinking. That would enable the 
emergence of a counter-hegemonic discourse in the political arena, so that 
the contestation process could be set in place and familial establishment 
could be eradicated.  
Since in order to engage in dialectical thinking we must first overcome 
the worldview we have taken as given and negate it,
247
 the best way to do 
so would be abolishing civil marriage. This would provide us with the 
opportunity to imagine a world in which all family arrangements are 
valued. People would feel free to experiment and engage in new family 
arrangements. That in turn would bring the family into the political 
discussion as people would begin to seek legal protection for their 
arrangements or their personas in function of their membership to those 
arrangements. As a result of this dialectical and right-seeking process, 
family-normativity would be for the first time challenged. 
B. The Perils in Abolishing Marriage 
However, due to the reified idea that family arrangements must be 
legally regulated, disestablishing the family by completely abolishing civil 
marriage—even in theory, as we have seen with Knouse’s proposal in Part 
IV
248—is not simple. Yet, the most complicated part of abolishing civil 
marriage lies in making sure that its banishment from the legal realm does 
not represent in the end a new way to strengthen marriage and in turn 
family-normativity. As Nancy J. Knauer observes “the abolition of civil 
marriage invites the possibility that existing inequities will be reproduced 
in the continuing legal interface required to enforce and monitor the newly 
privatized arrangements.”249 
Abolishing civil marriage, as Tamara Metz notes, could mean a shift in 
the control of marriage from legal authorities to cultural and social ones.
250
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The proposed regime could benefit marriage by invigorating its hegemonic 
status.
251
 Metz’s proposal does not challenge family-normativity.252 
Moreover, under her proposal the institutions that led us to family-
normativity and the established family-marriage dyad would retain the 
power to keep doing so.
253
  
Precisely this is the objective of Edward Zelinsky in abolishing 
marriage. He advocates for deregulating marriage on a pro-marriage basis. 
Zelinsky would like to strengthen marriage through its deregulation.
254
 His 
claim is that marriage “should become solely a religious and cultural 
institution with no legal definition or status.”255 The main argument 
Zelinsky presents is that “eliminating civil marriage will strengthen 
marriage by encouraging competition among alternative versions of 
marriage.”256 He believes that “once [we are] free of the constraints 
inherent in a legal definition of civil marriage, additional, presently 
unforeseeable, models of marriage will emerge as entrepreneurial energies 
are focused on the deregulated market for marriage.”257  
Although this might sound like opening the door for dialectical 
thinking, we should remember two things: (1) that the hegemonic 
discourse of family-normativity was created and maintained by these 
religious institutions; and (2) that a free market for marriages with 
religious and secular institutions leading the way existed—and still exists 
in some parts of the world—and what it has brought is familial 
establishment.
258
 Moreover, new forms of marriage like same-sex 
marriage do not represent a departure from the current conception of the 
family, but a challenge to other hegemonic discourses conflated in the 
family-marriage dyad. Thus, family-normativity under his proposal 
remains untouched.  
Another reason not to take Zelinsky’s proposal as a model is that it is 
not truly a deregulating scheme, but rather a multi-regulating one. Instead 
of having the state regulate the family, Zelinsky has multiple social 
institutions establishing multiple versions of the family-marriage dyad. 
Yet, that does not guarantee that dialectical thinking will ensue. As it has 
 
 
 251. Id.  
 252. See supra Part IV. 
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 255. Id. 
 256. Id. at 1173. 
 257. Id. at 1177. 
 258. See STEPHANIE COONTZ, MARRIAGE, A HISTORY: FROM OBEDIENCE TO INTIMACY OR HOW 
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been discussed, we can have multiple versions of the family-marriage 
dyad reinforcing the same hegemonic discourse of family-normativity. On 
the contrary, we could end up strengthening the family-normativity 
hegemonic discourse since we would have more institutions infusing 
reified notions, and our capacity to contest those notions would be more 
easily diminished as we would be under the mistaken impression that 
dialectical thinking is occurring. 
Moreover, his scheme does not mean that the law would be out of the 
business of regulating the family. Zelinsky notes that “a deregulated 
marital regime would require default rules for those couples who fail to 
contract and for those couples whose contracts fail to address particular 
issues.”259 Those rules will make use of the marriage proxy in order to 
regulate the effects of coming into a marital relationship. As long as the 
law uses the marriage proxy, we will not be able to move away from 
family-normativity and toward a more coherent legal scheme. In addition, 
Zelinsky not only intends the state to retain the faculty to regulate the 
effects of coming into a family arrangement, but also he envisions the state 
preserving the power to decide who can enter into marital arrangements by 
regulating the age of consent to contract and also preserving the faculty to 
determine which kinds of family arrangements are acceptable under the 
public policy exception. Thus, Zelinsky’s proposal is not truly a 
deregulating scheme.  
Moreover, Zelinsky’s proposal to abolish marriage posits a real 
dangerous outcome. He intends to abolish marriage as a way to minimize 
political friction. His main point is that the best way “for a diverse polity 
to resolve contentious issues with minimum strife is to decentralize and 
privatize those issues.”260 In the case of marriage, he believes that reducing 
political friction would bolster marriage,
261
 since it would make it recede 
from the public discussion and the energies used in the struggle to control 
the state definition of marriage would be used for other more pressing 
 
 
 259. Zelinsky, supra note 31, at 1182. 
 260. Id. at 1164. This argument is mainly elaborated to convince the proponents of same-sex 
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political issues.
262
 However, as the discussion of reification shows, that 
part of breaking from hegemonic ideas is precisely engaging in dialectical 
thinking, which requires an active political discussion.
263
 A proposal to 
disestablish the family cannot intend to reduce political friction, because it 
is precisely political friction that is needed in order to generate hegemonic 
contestation. Thus, his proposition for deregulating marriage is not a step 
forward in diversifying the conception of the family, but a big leap 
backwards.  
Another step backwards is Daniel Crane’s proposal to privatize 
marriage as a way to break away from the reified idea that family 
arrangements must be legally regulated.
264
 His proposal shows how solely 
demystifying the reified idea of family arrangements being legally 
regulated does not necessarily entail familial disestablishment, but could 
instead reinforce family-normativity. Crane points out how by advocating 
for a uniform legal definition of marriage in order to save the institution of 
marriage, religious groups are promoting the reified idea that marriage 
should be legally regulated, which is contrary to the Christian and Judeo 
traditions.
265
 
Crane intends to stop this alleged erosion of the definition of marriage 
by giving back to religious institutions the exclusive faculty to regulate 
it.
266
 He believes privatizing marriage would “restore religion to marriage, 
and marriage to religion.”267 Privatization is the key concept in his 
proposal. The hegemonic discourse of family-normativity cannot be 
contested or transformed if the family-marriage dyad is still sanctioned by 
the state, albeit its official regulation is being exercised by other social 
institutions than the legal system. Crane is aware that if a hegemonic 
discourse is to be preserved, the government and legal institutions cannot 
 
 
 262. Id. 
 263. See supra Part V.D. 
 264. Daniel Crane, A “Judeo-Christian” Argument for Privatizing Marriage, 27 CARDOZO L 
REV.1221 (2006). 
 265. For instance, Crane points out how this reified idea that family arrangements must be legally 
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be completely out of the picture. Under his proposal, the state must 
recognize the marriages celebrated by religious communities and legally 
sanction them.
268
 His proposal is a multi-regulating scheme just as 
Zelinsky’s, and thus fails in the same respects. 
C. An Effective Proposal to Abolish Marriage  
If we truly strive to disestablish the family by abolishing civil marriage, 
we should seek to avoid the elements of these proposals that reinforce 
family-normativity and facilitate the establishment of definition of the 
family. Such a proposal should adhere to the following 10 objectives or 
parameters. 
1. The family must be brought to the political arena. The proposal 
cannot intend to reduce political friction, because such friction is needed in 
order to generate hegemonic contestation. 
2. Our focus must be the family-marriage dyad.  
3. This dyad must be banished from our legal system. 
4. It is imperative to uncover the unacknowledged hegemonic discourse 
of family-normativity and bring it to the political discussion. 
5. The promotion of the values embodied in the hegemonic discourse 
of family-normativity must be evaded.  
6. The proposal could not entail a mere name substitution of one 
unequivocal definition of the family for another.  
7. Trying to contest the other hegemonic discourses associated with the 
family-marriage dyad should be avoided. The focus must remain on 
family-normativity.  
8. The proposal should avoid sanctioning the involvement of the state 
and legal institutions in the business of recognizing which family 
arrangements are of social importance.  
9. Likewise, the proposal cannot rely on a privatization scheme that 
will yield the regulation of family arrangements in the same institutions 
that created the problem of familial establishment in the first place.  
10. Finally, the proposal should demystify the reified idea that family 
arrangements must be legally regulated. 
Abolishing marriage thus implies discarding the label of marriage and 
removing the state from the business of giving recognition to a specific set 
of family arrangements based solely in the marriage proxy. It requires that 
all the laws that make reference to the family-marriage dyad must be re-
 
 
 268. Id. at 1252. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
252 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 5:189 
 
 
 
 
examined in terms of their purposes so that the reference to marriage is 
removed and the real purposes for which the law was supposedly enacted 
are followed. That requires the creation of new proxies not based on 
definitions of what family arrangements should be but rather proxies 
narrowly tailored to the actual common goods and harms that society 
would like to promote and prevent. In order to create those new proxies 
we would be forced to have conversations about what are those common 
goods that we as a society would like to promote and how is the best way 
to do so, which would promote dialectical thinking. Today, those 
conversations have been obscured by the marriage proxy. 
If this model to abolish marriage is followed, we would be able to 
recognize the plurality of family arrangements and give protection to all of 
them since the new proxies that would have to be created would truly 
embody the common goods intended to be promoted, which should apply 
in the same way to everyone equally situated unlike the marriage proxy. It 
would also permit the contestation of the hegemonic discourse of family-
normativity as it would be generating dialectical. As dialectical thinking 
occurs, more people would be able to start to create and establish their 
own family arrangements and would not fear being subjected to a 
regulatory scheme that would ostracize them. That in turn would allow 
true counter-hegemonic discourses against family-normativity to appear in 
the public discussion with possibilities of contesting the hegemonic 
discourse. Once we are free from all the reified notions associated with 
family-normativity, legal regulation in Family Law as in other spheres of 
the law such as Property, Torts, Estates, Taxes, Contracts and Immigration 
would be re-examined to see if they serve any legitimate purposes other 
than supporting the hegemonic discourse of family-normativity. In that 
way, legal regulation would be more coherent. In addition, people who do 
not have access now to the court or the law for their domestic disputes 
would be heard. Finally, social and political inequalities would be 
diminished, as well as inequalities between people arising from different 
family arrangements. Consequently, we would be on the path to a more 
just and fair society.  
D. A World Without Marriage 
Describing the post-marriage landscape is beyond the scope of this 
project. The intention of this paper is to open the door to dialectical 
thinking, so family-normativity could be contested and familial 
disestablishment eradicated. Prescribing what the new proxies that should 
substitute the marriage proxy without an extensive discussion on the 
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reasons why that should be the new legal scheme contradicts the very 
spirit of dialectical thinking. Therefore, although I have a clear idea of 
what those proxies should be and the reasons why they should be adopted, 
I will not proffer a list of them.
269
 I do not wish to close that discussion by 
just offering my ideas, but instead ignite it with the possibilities that 
abolishing marriage represents. The proposal of abolishing marriage is 
valuable by itself precisely because it forces those discussions about the 
common goods we would like to promote through the law. There is no 
need to offer an exhaustive account of the post-marriage landscape to 
appreciate the benefits of the proposal to abolish civil marriage. However, 
a glimpse into the world without marriage is necessary to understand the 
practical implications of our proposal.  
As it was just discussed, in a world without civil marriage, we would 
have to come up with new proxies and re-evaluate the interests we are 
allegedly protecting through the law. In the cases of the incoherent 
legislation discussed in Part III,
270
 that would mean that no matter the 
status of the relationship of the couple, their offspring would be treated 
equally in terms of child support. In the case of domestic violence, victims 
would not be denied protection because they are not a member of an 
established family arrangement. Instead, we would have to create a proxy 
such as “a victim is a person that is having or has had a romantic or sexual 
relationship with her or his aggressor.” That would prevent the real harm 
the law seeks to avoid, which is a lesion to the physical integrity of a 
person in a susceptible position. At the same time, this proxy would avoid 
stigmatizing people equally situated who today do not receive such 
protection.  
Finally, abolishing civil marriage would mean the re-examination of 
current controversial issues as it would force us to look to the entire law 
system that is premised on the marriage proxy. For instance, health 
insurance coverage would need to be reexamined. In a world without a 
family arrangement proxy and an established definition of the family, we 
would need to determine how we establish who will be covered under the 
health policy of an individual. That conversation could go from what is the 
new proxy—simple designation of beneficiaries, biological ties or 
household ties—to the hard question of why people need to be covered. If 
we really would like people to be well off in terms of their health, then 
why not posit the issue in terms of universal health coverage. That type of 
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dialectical thinking is a better way of facing our more pressing issues, as it 
precludes treating equally situated people differently. Taking into account 
that the marriage proxy is used in all spheres of the law, abolishing it and 
bringing dialectical thinking to the table will impact positively all corners 
of our legal system.  
VII. LET’S CALL THE WHOLE THING OFF!!!!!!! 
By advocating only minor reforms in family law, they [most family 
law scholars] convey the message that family law is basically fair. 
Because they discourage us from considering more radical change, 
their work contributes to the apologetic project of legitimating the 
status quo.
271
 
In this project, I have aspired to depart from the apologetic agenda that has 
legitimated familial establishment and facilitated the current unfair and 
incoherent legal regulation of the family. By examining the historical 
development of the established definition of the family, I have uncovered 
that at the heart of this undemocratic and unjust system is the institution of 
marriage. Marriage has been used as a proxy to promote and preserve 
through the law the unequivocal conception of the family as a 
bureaucratized, monogamous, sexuated married couple with children.  
Through the marriage proxy, our legal system seeks to channel people 
into the marital family at a very high cost. First, the state dictates how 
intimate relationships should be lived and arranged, which undermines the 
liberty rights of a large group of people because they are withheld from 
exploring other types of possible arrangements. Second, it has created an 
inconsistent body of law that does not protect the real interests it claims to 
protect. Finally, that inconsistent body of regulation has created a caste 
system that has generated profound legal and social inequalities that 
oppose the basic tenants of our society. 
These pernicious consequences of familial establishment have not 
passed unnoticed to scholars. Yet, the most prominent proposals that 
attempt to tackle them fail in coming up with a solution that would not 
sanction an unequivocal definition of the family and would legally protect 
all types of family arrangements. At the end, all of the proposals surveyed 
reinstate the same inequality problems we face today with our current 
established definition of the family. These proposals failed in bringing 
forth familial disestablishment because they depart from the liberal 
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discourse of rights, which either ignores the marriage proxy, its effects or 
only intends to broaden the current established definition of the family 
without challenging the idea that family arrangements must be legally 
defined or regulated. Since all responses to the established definition of 
the family up to this date ultimately bring us back to the problem of 
familial establishment, I decided to approach the problem from a different 
theoretical perspective.  
I have proposed to move from a narrative of rights to a narrative of 
power by adhering to a Neo-Marxist approach. Such a philosophical 
framework encompasses the multiple dimensions of the problem that 
include a power struggle and the creation of a ruling worldview. 
Specifically, I took on Gramsci’s ideas of hegemony and hegemonic 
contestation, and Lukács’ idea of reification. Even though these two 
frameworks served as a platform for proposing a feasible solution to the 
problem of familial establishment, they did not come without challenges. 
First, both philosophical perspectives required the articulation of a new 
language that could account for the lack of one with regard to the 
phenomena under study. Second, I was forced to fill some gaps within 
their theories in order to find final answers to our inquiries.  
This analytical inquiry produced the three main contributions of this 
paper. First, the subject of study should be the family-marriage dyad. We 
should not be talking about marriage and family separately, since our 
current legal process of granting rights to family arrangements is premised 
on using marriage as proxy.  
Second, in order to fully understand the legal and social ramifications 
of that dyad, we must acknowledge that there is an hegemonic discourse to 
which courts, scholars and people in general have been referencing 
without really naming it or establishing its contours. That hegemonic 
discourse is what I have denominated as family-normativity. Family-
normativity encompasses all the elements of our current definition of the 
family. This hegemonic discourse naturalizes the established definition of 
the family and makes individuals seek refuge under the rubric of that 
definition instead of challenging it in order to have a more egalitarian 
system.  
While family-normativity makes it harder to challenge familial 
establishment, that is not the reason why we have not been able to achieve 
familial disestablishment. Most hegemonic discourses are being 
continuously challenged. The final contribution explains what is really 
behind our incapacity to move toward familial disestablishment even 
though we have challenged other hegemonic discourses in Family Law 
and we have disestablished other institutions such as religion. This is due 
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to the reified idea that family arrangements must be legally regulated. Our 
uncontested understanding that the law should offer an exhaustive account 
of what a family should be is the floodgate holding family 
disestablishment from coming to fruition.  
In order to break from it, we must embark in dialectal thinking. If we 
do, we would realize that the most viable option is to abolish civil 
marriage. Yet, the proposal to abolish marriage must entail a true 
obliteration of the institution. Otherwise, the proposal would reinforce 
familial establishment as the proposals to abolish marriage have done thus 
far. In order to avoid that, we must discard the label of marriage and 
remove the state from the business of giving recognition to a specific set 
of family arrangements based solely in a proxy. Once we do that, we will 
be forced to re-examine all the laws that make reference to the family-
marriage dyad, so that the reference to marriage is removed and the real 
purposes for which the laws were supposedly enacted are finally followed. 
If this model to abolish marriage is followed, we would be able to 
recognize the plurality of family arrangements and give protection to all of 
them. People would be able to establish their own family arrangements 
since they would not fear being subjected to a regulatory scheme that 
would ostracize them. Consequently, contestation of the hegemonic 
discourse of family-normativity would ensue, since true counter-
hegemonic discourses would appear in the political debate. Finally, 
abolishing civil marriage would create a more egalitarian society as we 
would be forced to rethink the entire legal system in order to come up with 
proxies related to the common goods and harms we wish to promote and 
avoid, and not in proxies based on family arrangements that treat equally 
situated people differently. 
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